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ESSAY
THE SUPREME COURT FORECASTING PROJECT:
LEGAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
APPROACHES TO PREDICTING SUPREME
COURT DECISIONMAKING
Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin, &
Kevin M. Quinn*
This Essay reports the results of an interdisciplinary project comparing
political science and legal approaches to forecasting Supreme Court decisions.
For every argued case during the 2002 Term, we obtained predictions of the
outcome prior to oral argument using two methods—one a statistical model
that relies on general case characteristics, and the other a set of independent
predictions by legal specialists.  The basic result is that the statistical model
did better than the legal experts in forecasting the outcomes of the Term’s
cases:  The model predicted 75% of the Court’s affirm/reverse results cor-
rectly, while the experts collectively got 59.1% right.  These results are nota-
ble, given that the statistical model disregards information about the specific
law or facts of the cases.  The model’s relative success was due in large part to
its ability to predict more accurately the important votes of the moderate Jus-
tices (Kennedy and O’Connor) at the center of the current Court.  The legal
experts, by contrast, did best at predicting the votes of the more ideologically
extreme Justices, but had difficulty predicting the centrist Justices.  The rela-
tive success of the two methods also varied by issue area, with the statistical
model doing particularly well in forecasting “economic activity” cases, while
the experts did comparatively better in the “judicial power” cases.  In addi-
tion to reporting the results in detail, the Essay explains the differing methods
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of prediction used and explores the implications of the findings for assessing
and understanding Supreme Court decisionmaking.
INTRODUCTION
“Our business is prophecy, and if prophecy were certain, there
would not be much credit in prophesying.”1
The 2002 Term of the Supreme Court underscored two essential,
and fairly obvious, features of the institution and its place in American
political society.  The Court is often important, and it is occasionally sur-
prising.  The Court’s decisions impact a diverse array of vital economic,
social, and structural questions.  To mention just a few of the Term’s
cases, the Court declared rules about the constitutionality of affirmative
action,2 the right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy,3 various
free speech rights,4 and the contours of the federal-state allocation of
authority.5  Furthermore, the Court’s decisions in these and other areas
are frequently hard to predict in advance, at least in the eyes of many
lawyers, legal academics, and specialized journalists who follow the Court
closely.  Commentary on the 2002 Term has described it as “stunn[ing],”6
“a [s]urprise,”7 “startling,”8 “idiosyncratic,”9 “counterintuitive,” and as
“upending the expectations of those who watch and analyze it.”10
Our study joins this discussion of the Supreme Court and its 2002
Term, but from a different temporal perspective than most legal and po-
litical science commentary on the Court.  Rather than focus retrospec-
tively, and proceed to analyze, critique, quantify, regress, debunk, recon-
cile, classify, or applaud some set of the Court’s past decisions, we instead
applied two different methods to predict the outcome of every case ar-
gued in the Term.  In advance of the oral argument date, we obtained
predicted outcomes using two methods—one a statistical model that fore-
casts outcomes based on six general case characteristics, and the other a
set of independent predictions from a large group of legal specialists,
each making particularized assessments of one or more cases.  We discuss
these methods and the results, as well as the study’s implications and limi-
tations, at length later in this Essay, but the condensed version is that,
1. Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision:  Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J.
357, 362 (1925).
2. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
3. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
4. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
5. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
6. Charles Lane, Civil Liberties Were Term’s Big Winner:  Supreme Court’s Moderate
Rulings a Surprise, Wash. Post, June 29, 2003, at A1.
7. Id.
8. Linda Greenhouse, In a Momentous Term, Justices Remake the Law, and the
Court, N.Y. Times, July 1, 2003, at A1.
9. Tony Mauro, It’s a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad Court:  Justices Upended Expectations in
2002–2003 Term, Tex. Law., July 7, 2003, at 12.
10. Id.
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somewhat to our surprise,11 the machine did significantly better at pre-
dicting outcomes than did the experts.  While the experts correctly fore-
cast outcomes in 59.1% of cases, the machine got a full 75% right.
The prospective orientation of this study is unusual—but the com-
parative study of Supreme Court decisionmaking by legal and political
science scholars is not.  The body of work on the Supreme Court in both
disciplines is large and diverse, and taken together embraces a wide range
of motivational theories about how, and why, the Justices decide cases as
they do.12  Some of these accounts explore the potential constraints on
judicial discretion supplied by case law, text, and history, others focus on
broader interpretive theories, others highlight the Justices’ individual
policy preferences or social backgrounds, and others regard the Court
and its Justices as operating strategically in a complex institutional setting
that can influence outcomes.  Most of these positions have adherents in
both the law and political science academies, and many scholars in both
disciplines regard several, if not all, of the aforementioned factors as im-
portant influences on judicial decisionmaking.  Although legal academics
as a group place relatively more weight on doctrine, text, and legal princi-
ple in their analysis of judicial behavior, and political scientists tend to
stress attitudinal and institutional explanations more heavily, both disci-
plines are highly internally heterogeneous in terms of motivational
theory.
Much plainer than this theoretical picture are clear differences in
the methods that legal academics and political scientists typically use to
study the Court.  The basic distinctions are several.  The first relates to
the component of the Court’s output that is the focal point of study.
Most legal academics direct significant attention to the internal content
of the Court’s opinions in a given area.  This generality applies not just to
those who would justify or reconcile particular doctrinal or historical
statements by the Court, but also to doctrine skeptics and critics who
often seek to undermine the Court’s rationales by exposing flaws in the
expressed judicial reasoning through close analysis and critique.  Con-
versely, political scientists have tended to focus more heavily (and often
exclusively) on the Court’s basic results (“affirm” or “reverse”) and the
Justices’ individual votes in support of or dissent from such outcomes.
Harold Spaeth, long a leading proponent of the attitudinal model of judi-
cial decisionmaking in the political science academy, expressed this dis-
tinction sharply in a debate with a more doctrine-focused colleague de-
cades ago:  “I find the key to judicial behavior in what the justices do,
Professor Mendelson in what they say.  I focus upon their votes, he upon
11. And perhaps chagrin, at least for the two of us who claim some legal expertise
ourselves.
12. We summarize a fraction of this literature infra Part I.  Not treated here is the
large corpus of normative scholarship in law and (to a lesser degree) in political science
about how Justices should go about deciding cases.
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their opinions.”13  Many political scientists who dispute Spaeth’s attitudi-
nal conclusions nonetheless share his initial approach to assessing Court
decisionmaking by looking first at voting results.14
Another general difference in method is the number of cases that
are subject to a given effort of analytical synthesis.  Many legal scholars
who seek to understand the Court study a handful of cases in a particular
doctrinal area, and weight the cases unevenly, placing analytical primacy
on the “leading” holdings.15  Such focus is driven by the prevailing con-
ventions of legal scholarship.  Close reading and analysis of opinion con-
tent takes time, and convincing explanation or refutation even longer,
placing practical limits on the number of holdings a legal scholar can
meaningfully synthesize for analytical purposes.  The subspecialization of
the legal academy also leads to a narrower focus.16  A very different base-
line method exists in political science study of the Court.  It is common-
place for a quantitative political science study to take account of several
dozen or even several hundred cases.  And in most cumulative studies, no
case is given extra weight as a “leading” case; instead all are weighted
equally for analytical purposes.  Moreover, to the extent political scien-
tists look at subject matter, it is often in more general categories, like
“economic regulation,” or “civil liberties,” rather than the narrow doctri-
nal categories, such as “ERISA law” or “search and seizure law,” that oc-
cupy legal scholars.
For all of this methodological and theoretical disagreement, how-
ever, virtually all legal and political science scholarship on the Supreme
Court is retrospective in nature.17  Whether analyzing a single case, a sin-
gle Term, an entire area of doctrine, or even every Court decision over
13. Harold J. Spaeth, Jurimetrics and Professor Mendelson:  A Troubled Relationship,
27 J. Pol. 875, 879 (1965).
14. Even those neoinstitutional political science scholars who do look within judicial
opinions often treat their content as evidence of specific strategic choices made by the
Justices.  See, e.g., Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and
Judicial Choice:  New Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in
Supreme Court Decision-Making:  New Institutionalist Approaches 43, 47 (Cornell W.
Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (discussing impact of Justices’ strategic interaction
on opinion content).
15. The history of the Harvard Law Review’s annual Foreword on the previous Court
Term exemplifies this feature of legal scholarship about the Supreme Court.  Only one
Foreword in thirty-seven years has ever mentioned, much less analyzed, every case in the
preceding Term.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court,
1993 Term—Foreword:  Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26 (1994).  Likewise, the
Supreme Court Review, a peer-reviewed journal of legal scholarship on the Court, typically
features analytical pieces centered on particular holdings and doctrines.
16. A constitutional scholar would probably not examine an ERISA case, an ERISA
scholar might not take account of a FERC case, and a FERC expert might ignore a habeas
case decided contemporaneously.
17. This is obviously true of most legal critiques of particular decisions or sets of
decisions, but it is also true even of political science models that make claims of
“prediction.”  These models, discussed infra Part I, typically regress past data sets to assess
consistency with various motivational hypotheses, and although they speak in terms of
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several decades, those who study the Court typically apply competing ex-
planatory frameworks to a set of existing historical facts, namely the
Court’s results, or opinions, or both.  This is neither surprising nor inap-
propriate, but neither is it necessarily intrinsic in the study of a mul-
tifactorial phenomenon like Supreme Court decisionmaking.18  What is
notable, in light of all the attention focused on the Court, is that few have
tried to systematically predict its decisions prospectively.  Given the high
economic, social, and political importance of the Court’s decisions, a
model that could prospectively forecast decisionmaking at a high rate of
accuracy would be an invaluable tool to litigants and Court-watchers, even
if the model itself were incompletely theorized.  But prediction also has
the potential to advance explanation by verifying, undermining, or modi-
fying preexisting conceptions of the best ways to study the Court and un-
derstand how the Justices arrive at their decisions.
Our study compares two distinct methods of forecasting Supreme
Court action, each drawing on the insights and strengths of a different
discipline.  Thus, the two prediction methods diverge dramatically in
terms of methodology, and in this sense embody many of the differences
between law and political science discussed above.  The most notable dis-
tinction inheres in the level of generality the two methods employ.  The
statistical model looks at only a handful of case characteristics, each of
them gross features easily observable without specialized legal expertise,
and builds on general patterns ascertained from all 628 cases decided by
the Rehnquist Court since 1994 and prior to the 2002 Term.  The model
is indifferent to many of the specific legal and factual aspects of the cases,
instead predicting outcomes based on the same six (and only six) observ-
able characteristics of each case.19  The legal experts, by contrast, utilized
particularized knowledge, such as the specific facts of the case or state-
ments by individual Justices in similar cases.  We did not constrain the
experts to consider only “legal” factors that might drive the Court’s deci-
sion.  But although many considered nonlegal factors such as the Justices’
policy preferences, the experts, unlike the statistical model, could (and
did) consider particular case law and specific constitutional or statutory
texts and were thus able to particularize their analysis with regard to sin-
gle cases in a way that the model was not.
The basic result of our study is that the statistical model did better by
a fair margin in forecasting the outcomes of last Term’s cases:  The
“predictive” accuracy, what they do is more technically called “postdiction.”  There have
been, however, a few more overt prediction efforts that we note in the next section.
18. Other disciplines that combine theory and retrospective empirical observation,
such as economics or medicine, also incorporate forecasting experiments that provide
some additional evidence in support or refutation of general explanatory theories.
19. The case variables are:  (1) circuit of origin; (2) issue area of the case; (3) type of
petitioner (e.g., the United States, an employer, etc.); (4) type of respondent; (5)
ideological direction (liberal or conservative) of the lower court ruling; and (6) whether
the petitioner argued that a law or practice is unconstitutional. See infra Part II.B for a
more detailed description of the model.
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model predicted 75% of the Court’s affirm/reverse results correctly,
while the experts collectively got 59.1% right.  Part III below examines
this result and more specific findings of interest including the model’s
notable relative success at predicting the important votes of the moderate
Justices (Kennedy and O’Connor) at the center of the current Court and
its high success rate in certain general issue areas.  Two earlier sections
elaborate on the study’s motivation (Part I) and methodological design
(Part II).
This experiment captures only one specific Term and only one spe-
cific group of Justices, cases, and experts.  The results might well be dif-
ferent in a different Term or with different experts.  But for the 2002
Term, the model achieved notable success by utilizing a set of factors that
appear to correlate with the Justices’ decisionmaking.  That a forecasting
machine that is indifferent to specific doctrine and text can predict cases
so well is interesting, surprising, and worthy of further thought.  Moreo-
ver, as discussed in Part IV, the statistical model is in some sense based on
spatial voting models, and as such, is consistent with decades of work in
political science.  Despite significant skepticism about the constraining
effects of doctrine and text at the Supreme Court level, law professors still
tend to think about individual Supreme Court cases in relatively particu-
laristic legal terms.  The model’s success at using a much more general
set of case factors to predict outcomes offers insights for all those who
study and practice before the Court.  We discuss these implications in
Part IV.
I. HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Just over a hundred years ago, Holmes announced his “prediction”
theory of law, explaining that “[t]he prophesies of what the courts will do
in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”20
This formulation remains highly contested in several ways, but in one par-
ticular sense—as a theoretical response to the classical legal thought of
the late nineteenth century—its impact was pervasive.  Holmes and his
followers undermined the classical notion of law as a set of static, natural,
and apolitical rules that could be mechanically discerned and applied by
judges,21 and in so doing helped to change the way in which American
scholars regard the law and the legal process.  Much of law is, in the mod-
ern conception, something that political society makes, and judges play
some part in the making.
20. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461
(1897).  Elsewhere in his address, Holmes reiterated the point:  “The object of our study,
then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the
instrumentality of the courts.”  Id. at 457.
21. A paradigmatic expression of this classical ideal is Christopher Columbus
Langdell’s claim that “law is a science, and that all the available materials of that science
are contained in printed books.”  Christopher C. Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches,
in 3 L.Q. Rev. 123, 124 (1887).
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For all of its conceptual impact on twentieth-century legal scholar-
ship,22 however, there is one methodological invitation quite literally of-
fered by Holmesian prediction theory that legal scholars have generally
not taken up—they have only rarely explored systematic methods of pre-
dicting the outcome of cases prospectively.  Holmes was upfront about
the limitations of his own formulation for actually predicting cases, dis-
claiming that “[t]heory is my subject, not practical details.”23  And his
thin proposal for doing prediction was remarkably conventional:  Study
the “body of [case] reports, of treatises, and of statutes.”24  For the Real-
ists who followed Holmes, it was likewise easier to theorize negatively
against a prior generation’s classical doctrine than it was to offer a new
affirmative theory about how we might assess, predict, and discern regu-
larity in judicial decisionmaking in a world where doctrine did not always
constrain judges.  That many Realists never offered much beyond judges’
idiosyncratic “hunches” in terms of positive predictive theory was one of
the movement’s failings,25 and one keenly recognized by Karl Llewellyn
and others.  Throughout his long career Llewellyn searched hard for gen-
eral factors to aid in the prediction, or “reckonability,” of court behav-
ior—factors that were not linked to the particularities of case-specific doc-
trine or text.26
22. The basic proposition that judges exercise some degree of discretion in deciding
cases has directly or indirectly motivated a great amount of legal and political science
scholarship in the past century.  Some of these questions sound in political theory, such as
the longstanding debate in constitutional law over the alleged “countermajoritarian
difficulty” posed by unelected judges who exercise meaningful authority.  See generally
Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession:  The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L.J. 153 (2002) (tracing evolution of
academia’s focus on the countermajoritarian difficulty and placing this focus within body
of scholarship seeking to justify judicial review).  Other questions are more pragmatic and
empirical, and these indirectly motivate this study: How much discretion do judges have to
choose among alternative outcomes, particularly at the Supreme Court, where such
discretion is greatest?  Do “legal” sources—such as precedent or legal text—constrain the
Justices in a meaningful and recognizable way, and if so, how?  Where text and precedent
do not constrain, what other factors drive judicial decisionmaking?  Are these nonlegal
factors predictable and generalizable, or hopelessly idiosyncratic and personal?  Do the
Justices act differently in different kinds of cases with different doctrinal and institutional
settings?  And finally, what methods of assessing Supreme Court decisions best illuminate
the foregoing queries?
23. Holmes, supra note 20, at 477.  See also Frederick Schauer, Prediction and R
Particularity, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 773, 774 (1998) (describing significant theoretical
commentary on Holmes’s argument, but noting that “[m]uch less attention has been
focused on the idea of prediction itself, or on the mechanisms by which a person . . . might
predict what the law will do”).
24. Holmes, supra note 20, at 457. R
25. See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law
1870–1960, at 193–212 (1992) (discussing major tenets, strains, and legacy of Legal
Realism).
26. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition:  Deciding Appeals 17–18,
223, 335–36 (1960) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Common Law Tradition]; see also K.N.
Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 224, 243–46
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With the waning of Realism in the law schools, much of the academic
interest in prediction of cases shifted across campus to the fledgling field
of quantitative political science as applied to courts.  Spurred by the legal
positivist impulse but also possessing specialized training in statistics, for-
mal modeling, and other methodological tools—and unburdened by any
strong commitment to lawyers’ forms of thought and analysis—mid-cen-
tury political scientists took research on judicial behavior in important
new directions.  Some of this work is characterized by an effort to reduce
judicial decisionmaking to a few general explanatory variables, and then
study a large number of court results (typically not opinions) to assess
consistency with these factors.27
One political science model that arose early in this story and has
remained prominent is the “attitudinal” model of Supreme Court behav-
ior.  In its purest form, this model posits that the Justices generally decide
cases based upon their fixed policy preferences—that is, their personal
ideological views—and are not meaningfully constrained from voting in
accord with those views by doctrine, text, or institutional setting.28  More-
over, in the standard attitudinal view the Justices are arrayed neatly along
one or more linear dimensions based on a “liberal” to “conservative”
spectrum of personal views (think of an abacus with nine beads), and
most decisions track this ideological lineup.  In quantitative studies run
retrospectively, the attitudinal model has been very successful in account-
ing for—technically “postdicting”—the outcomes of Supreme Court
cases.
For all of its postdictive success, however, there are a few problems—
both technical and conceptual—with using the standard attitudinal
model to predict cases.  The technical problems are twofold.  The first is
that the attitudinal model is quite good at predicting the Justices’ array
along a particular linear dimension.  But in its basic form it is not particu-
larly good at situating specific cases ex ante along that linear array so as to
predict where the key decision point will be—that is, how many Justices
will vote one way and how many the other.  As long as the Justices’ votes
align according to the predicted spatial array, the outcome is regarded as
(1942) (describing a “new style” of legal scholarship that is rooted in “conscious and overt
concern” about policy, factuality, and scale); K.N. Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the
Newer Jurisprudence, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 581, 587 (1940) (“The method is to take accepted
doctrine, and check its words against its results, in the particular as in the large. . . . and to
be content with no formulation which does not account for all of the results.”).
27. We do not attempt here to summarize the various schools of thought about
judicial behavior that exist in the modern political science academy, much less provide a
detailed historical treatment.  For good recent descriptions of these academic
developments up through the present day, see Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a
Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics:  A Look Back, a Look Ahead, 53 Pol. Res. Q. 625
passim (2000), and Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal
Scholarship:  Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 819,
833–43.
28. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model 65 (1993).
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consistent with the attitudinal model, irrespective of the decisional divid-
ing line.29  So for instance, on the current Court a unanimous decision
either way is consistent with the attitudinal “prediction,” but so too is a 5-
4 decision where Justice O’Connor joins Rehnquist/Thomas/Scalia/Ken-
nedy, and so too is a 5-4 decision where she joins the Stevens/Ginsburg/
Breyer/Souter quartet.  The only type of decision that flunks the spatial
model is one where, say, Justices Scalia and Thomas vote with Stevens,
Ginsburg and Souter to vacate a defendant’s sentence and Justice Breyer
is with Rehnquist, O’Connor and Kennedy in dissent.30  Clearly, a model
that would claim predictive accuracy in a case like Grutter v. Bollinger,31
irrespective of whether Justice O’Connor voted to uphold or strike down
the affirmative action plan at issue, leaves much to be desired.
There is another technical problem with using the standard attitudi-
nal model to forecast cases prospectively:  In the retrospective studies,
postdiction for a specific case is achieved by matching up general vari-
ables with case-related factors contained in the Supreme Court opinions
for that case.  To predict cases using attitudinal models requires overlay-
ing a host of case-specific variables onto the basic spatial array.  But this
increased accuracy often comes at a methodological price—the fact-spe-
cific variables are often more numerous than the number of cases pre-
dicted.32  Jeffrey Segal solved some of these problems in a predictive
study of search and seizure cases (again technically postdiction), but his
successful effort there depended upon his review of the Court’s major
search and seizure decisions—that is, the cases to be explained—to iden-
tify the relevant variables.33  Moreover, his study only identified variables
useful for prediction in a narrow area of law (search and seizure cases).
None of these efforts purport to be generally applicable across all of the
Court’s cases, or to apply without regard to case-specific facts.
Beyond these technical problems, there is a conceptual step that the
leading proponents of this attitudinal model make that has generated
skepticism about the value of their postdictive studies.  The claim is that
29. On the current Court, this presumed spatial array has Stevens at one pole,
followed in order by Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, O’Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas.  See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 Pol. Analysis 134
passim (2002).  Although the Stevens end of the array is often labeled “liberal,” and the
Thomas end “conservative,” spatial voting consistency is revealed by the Justices
irrespective of the addition of such substantive labels for the opposite poles.
30. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
31. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
32. See, e.g., Fred Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Cases Mathematically:  A
Quantitative Analysis of the “Right to Counsel” Cases, 51 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1, 4–6 (1957).
33. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Predicting Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically:  The
Search and Seizure Cases, 1962–1981, 78 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 891, 892–93 (1984).  The same is
true for some of the rare legal academic forays into prospective forecasting.  Fred Rodell’s
nonquantitative prediction exercise in 1962 was accurate, but predicted only one case,
Baker v. Carr.  See Fred Rodell, For Every Justice, Judicial Deference Is a Sometime Thing,
50 Geo. L.J. 700, 707–08 (1962).
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the liberal-to-conservative preference array does not merely correlate with
judicial voting patterns, but that it is the primary cause of those votes.  As
the two leading proponents of the approach put it a decade ago:  “Rehn-
quist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall
voted the way he did because he is extremely liberal.”34  This general pat-
tern may hold, but the Justices’ votes and ideologies are not necessarily
linked precisely in this causal way.  Other factors may make the decisional
process more complex and nuanced than the attitudinalists’ account, and
many legal and political science skeptics have made these points.  In its
major form—“judicial ideology is all that matters”—attitudinalism is pillo-
ried for claiming too much; in its minor form—“judicial ideology matters
sometimes”—it is dismissed as telling us what we already knew, and with
lots of unpleasant counting of cases to boot.35
It is possible to broaden this kind of critique beyond attitudinalism
to encompass almost any general theory of Supreme Court decisionmak-
ing.  Do judicial attitudes, and institutional setting, and doctrine and text,
and broad principle and history matter to the Court’s outcomes?  Almost
certainly yes, yes, yes, and yes.  Does any one or two of these factors ex-
plain everything?  Probably not.  We think it probable that all of these
factors (and more) contribute in one way or another to the choices that
Justices make.  If decisionmaking is multifactorial in this sense, then it
should not be surprising that analytically deft legal academics and politi-
cal scientists can find evidence of their preferred factors in the Court’s
past behavior and write persuasive scholarship advancing their views.  The
problem is not that this diverse scholarship is defective, but rather that it
is so successful at advancing—within the analytical frameworks acceptable
in each discipline—a myriad of different factors that probably correlate
with judicial choices to a greater or lesser extent in individual cases.  This last
qualifier, however, is critical in actual prediction, for it is precisely this
greater or lesser degree to which various factors matter in real cases that
lead to real outcomes.
It is here that prospective prediction experiments can be helpful, not
necessarily by directly proving or disproving underlying causation, but by
measuring and assessing how various factors correlate with actual deci-
sionmaking in different kinds of cases.  One clear benefit of predictive
efforts is that their success is verifiable or refutable with the passage of
time in a way that retrospective analytical work is not.  Prediction exer-
cises thus have the potential to revise or unsettle preexisting academic
attitudes in ways that retrospective analyses of past data may not.  Al-
though mere prediction does not itself prove causation, the exercise of
34. Segal & Spaeth, supra note 28, at 65. R
35. Lon Fuller disparaged quantitative research on judicial behavior on these grounds
in 1966, writing that it adds “[n]ot much by way of practical utility” and that it was an
inefficient “scientific enterprise that seems to return so little from so much.”  Lon L. Fuller,
An Afterword:  Science and the Judicial Process, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1604, 1622 (1966).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-4\COL401.txt unknown Seq: 11 30-APR-04 18:24
1160 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1150
constructing and testing predictive models can advance both explanation
and understanding.36
II. PROJECT DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this study is to compare two different ways of assess-
ing and forecasting Supreme Court decisionmaking.  Its basic structure
necessarily shapes—and in some ways limits—our findings.  In this Part,
we first explain certain methodological choices in the overall design of
the study, then describe in greater detail the statistical model, and finally,
explore the nature of the legal experts’ decisionmaking.
A. Overall Study Design
1. The Rehnquist Supreme Court. — We chose to run our comparative
study by focusing on a single court—the United States Supreme Court—
and its output in a single Term.37  The Supreme Court is an obvious ob-
ject of study, both because of its importance as an institution and because
of the wealth of analytical and empirical scholarship and objective data
that have been collected regarding its work.  Moreover, this Supreme
Court offers a unique opportunity for research because the same nine
Justices had been sitting together for nearly a decade prior to the 2002
Term.  Because of the longevity of this natural court,38 both the statistical
36. Broad predictive exercises on the Court such as this are rare, although not
unprecedented.  Harold Spaeth in the 1970s predicted several dozen selected Supreme
Court cases per year, often with high success rates.  See William K. Stevens, The Professor’s
Computer Foretells Court’s Rulings, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1974, at 41.  There appears to be a
general increase in interest in prediction both specifically of the Supreme Court and in
many other settings.  Attorney Sam Heldman predicted the outcomes of every case on the
Supreme Court’s 2002 Term docket on his legal weblog.  See Sam Heldman, Ignatz:  Law
and Politics (June 27, 2003), at http://sheldman.blogspot.com/2003_06_01_sheldman_
archive.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  Another website promoted and ran a
contest entitled “Supreme Court Fantasy League” for predictions of selected cases in the
2002 Term and is currently running another for the 2003 Term.  See http://
www.lawpsided.com/lawpsidedcontests.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).  Recent months
have seen a more general academic and popular interest in prediction methodology in
fields as diverse as baseball and world terrorism.  See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Cass R.
Sunstein, Who’s on First, The New Republic, Sept. 1, 2003, at 27 (reviewing Michael
Lewis’s Moneyball, a book about innovative statistical techniques for forecasting baseball
performance developed by statistician Bill James and applied by the Oakland A’s and other
teams); Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and
Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming Summer 2004)
(describing the ill-fated proposal by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to
develop a “terrorism futures market”).
37. We included all argued cases in the Court’s regular October–June 2002 Term.
We did not include in our analysis the campaign finance case argued on September 8,
2003 (McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003)), even though that case was technically
argued during the October 2002 Term.  See Sup. Ct. R. 3.
38. We adopt the commonly accepted definition of “natural court” as referring to a
period of time where the same nine Justices sit together on the Supreme Court without any
composition change.  See, e.g., Joan Biskupic & Elder Witt, The Supreme Court at Work
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model and the legal experts have the benefit of hundreds of cases de-
cided by these same nine individuals on which to base predictions about
their future behavior.
2. Method, Not Theory. — Our study compares different methods of
prediction.  It does not directly contrast two mutually exclusive theories
about what motivates the Court.  Although scholars who study the Court
have long debated the motivations underlying the Justices’ decisions, we
do not join the stylized debate between “legalism” and “attitudinalism” in
any precise sense.  Neither of our methods of prediction is designed to
test a pure theory of what motivates the Justices—indeed, the individual
legal experts considered both legal and nonlegal factors in reaching their
predictions,39 and the variables utilized by the model do not capture
solely ideological motivations.  Still, in ways we describe more fully below,
underlying theoretical differences separate the two prediction methods.
The model used inputs derived in significant part from decades of politi-
cal science research on judicial decisionmaking that often began with atti-
tudinal assumptions.  Conversely, although our legal experts were not
strictly limited to considering only “the law,” they were chosen because of
their expertise in thinking about and writing about legal doctrine.
Despite this theoretical divergence, the most essential contrast be-
tween the two methods we employ lies in the differing nature of the in-
puts used to generate predictions.  The statistical model took into ac-
count the outcome of all 628 cases decided by this natural court prior to
the October 2002 Term.  In doing so, it gave each of those cases equal
weight in constructing the classification trees used to generate its predic-
tions.  The machine also relied on only a handful of characteristics about
those cases, each of them gross features easily observable without special-
ized training.  Although those characteristics might serve as proxies for
important aspects of the legal process, they are inherently blind to spe-
cific legal doctrines and texts.
By contrast, the legal experts were unlikely to consider all of the
Court’s decisions over the prior eight terms in reaching their predictions.
The nature of legal study—focused as it is on leading cases—predisposes
legal experts to focus on a handful of salient cases, rather than attempt to
weight all cases equally.  Even if they wanted to, basic cognitive limitations
would prevent the human experts from systematically and equivalently
taking account of every case previously decided by this natural court.
However, unlike the machine, the legal experts could recognize and take
account of particularized knowledge such as the facts of the case, specific
315 n.a (2d ed. 1997).  Scholars have taken to referring to the current Court’s
longstanding membership stability since October 1994 as the “second Rehnquist Court.”
See Thomas W. Merrill, Childress Lecture:  The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court:  A
Preliminary Analysis, 47 St. Louis L.J. 569, 570 (2003).
39. Few legal experts today are likely to be pure “legalists,” who would base prediction
and analysis exclusively on neutral doctrine and text without any inquiry into the particular
composition of the Court.
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legal doctrine or texts, or statements by individual Justices in similar
cases.  Thus, the experts, as compared with the machine, relied on fewer,
but more detailed, observations of past Court behavior.
3. Outcomes, Not Opinions. — In comparing the two methods, we fo-
cus on the outcomes of Supreme Court cases, not their internal content.
We designed the machine, and asked the experts, to make only a binary
choice between affirm or reverse outcomes in the Term’s cases.  We ac-
knowledge that such a binary choice offers an incomplete picture of the
Court’s work, but defend this focus on both substantive and methodologi-
cal grounds.  First, the basic outcomes produced by the Court impact
American society profoundly in ways that transcend the specific rationales
offered by the Justices.  Legal scholars continue to debate and critique
the judicial rationales offered in crucial cases such as Brown v. Board of
Education,40 Roe v. Wade,41 and Bush v. Gore,42 but for most of the nation’s
citizens it was the basic outcome of those decisions that carried the most
weight, and continues to do so.  More recently, in the case of Lawrence v.
Texas,43 the distinction in legal reasoning between Justice Kennedy’s ma-
jority opinion and Justice O’Connor’s concurrence is interesting and im-
portant, but for most Americans this distinction pales in comparison to
the essential fact that six Justices declared unconstitutional the Texas pro-
hibition on consensual homosexual sodomy.
Second, and more pragmatically, outcomes provide a common
ground on which to compare the predictive performance of the legal ex-
perts and the machine.  Although lawyers can and do make predictions
about both outcomes and reasoning, the model is incapable of generat-
ing predictions about the content of the Court’s opinions.  By design, the
statistical model is blind to legal doctrine in its inputs—and thus, it is
correspondingly mute as to doctrine in its predictive outputs.  In this
sense, the human experts have a broader analytical skill set, and one that
is vastly underutilized in this study.  But in order to have a uniform point
of comparison between the two methods, we needed to restrict our focus
to outcomes, the only type of prediction the model could produce.
None of this is intended to say that internal opinion content is unim-
portant, for the Justices’ rationales undoubtedly affect lower courts and
future legal developments in critical ways.  The reasons the Justices give
for their opinions matter, whether or not one regards the reasons given
as a complete explanation of behavior.  The Court’s opinions provide the
rules that lower courts apply, constitute the object of scholarly commen-
tary and critique, and shape public discourse on important issues.  Be-
cause our study does not account for this content, there is much it does
not, and cannot, say about the judicial process.  We readily acknowledge
the limitations of a study, like ours, that would have treated the most
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
41. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
43. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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famous case in American history as simply “Marbury loses,” without any
concern for what John Marshall actually said in reaching that result.44
But such a limitation is both substantively defensible and methodologi-
cally necessary in this sort of comparative study.
B. The Statistical Model
Our principal goal in constructing the statistical model was to create
a computer program capable of predicting the outcome of Supreme
Court cases prospectively, using only information available prior to oral
argument.  For reasons explained below, we used classification trees for
the statistical forecasting model.  The model’s predictions depended on
only six variables:  (1) circuit of origin; (2) issue area of the case; (3) type
of petitioner (e.g., the United States, an employer, etc.); (4) type of re-
spondent; (5) ideological direction (liberal or conservative) of the lower
court ruling; and (6) whether the petitioner argued that a law or practice
is unconstitutional.45  This information, when fed into the classification
trees, generated a predicted vote for each Justice and a predicted out-
come for each case pending before the Court in the 2002 Term.46
In creating the statistical model, we began with an assumption of
temporal stability in the Justices’ behavior.  In other words, we assumed
that observable patterns in the Justices’ past behavior would hold true for
their future behavior.  In order to capture these patterns, we utilized data
from all 628 cases decided by this natural court prior to the October 2002
Term, which we refer to as our “training data.”  We selected a number of
variables plausibly correlated with outcomes for potential inclusion in the
model, of which six were incorporated in the final model.47
Because our goal was predictive accuracy, not hypothesis testing, no
formal theory of Supreme Court decisionmaking drove our choice of vari-
44. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
45. “Circuit of origin” includes cases on appeal from a state or a three-judge federal
district court panel located within a particular circuit.  “Issue area” corresponds to the
VALUE variable in Harold Spaeth’s Supreme Court database.  See Harold J. Spaeth, The
Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953–2002 Terms,
Documentation 51 (last updated Nov. 25, 2003), available at http://polisci.msu.edu/pljp/
sctcode.PDF (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Spaeth, Documentation]
(explaining definition of VALUE variable).  “Type of petitioner” and “type of respondent”
also used Spaeth’s coding protocol, but several categories were collapsed.  For cases
pending in the 2002 Term, all six variables were coded from the petitioners’ merits briefs
before the Supreme Court using Spaeth’s coding protocol.
46. The model generates predicted probabilities for each possible outcome.  If the
forecasted probability of a reversal is greater than 50%, it is treated as a simple “reverse”
prediction, and likewise for predicted affirmances.
47. The variables considered for inclusion were:  liberal or conservative direction of
the lower court decision, issue area, circuit of origin, identity of the petitioner, identity of
the respondent, argument that a practice is unconstitutional, manner in which the Court
took jurisdiction, petitioner claim of lower court disagreement, whether the case came
from a state supreme court, and whether the petitioner argued that the Court should
overturn precedent.  Only the first six of these variables were used in the final model.
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ables.  Rather than searching for ideal measures of some explanatory vari-
able, we relied largely on pragmatic considerations.  In order to be useful
for forecasting, the information had to be easily observable and readily
available prior to oral argument.  We excluded some potentially useful
variables simply because the information was too difficult to collect.  Nev-
ertheless, the selection of potential variables drew on existing literature
about the Court, and, in particular, attitudinalist insights.  For example,
attitudinal models of Supreme Court voting suggest that whether the
lower court decision was liberal or conservative will often correlate (posi-
tively or negatively) with the votes of the Justices.  Similarly, the identity
of the parties might affect the political valence of a case, and philosophi-
cal or ideological differences between the circuits might lead to differing
patterns of responses from the Justices.  But although they influenced our
choice of potential variables, basic attitudinal assumptions are insufficient
to generate specific forecasts prospectively for the reasons discussed in
Part I.  The basic attitudinal model fails to specify ex ante where a particu-
lar case will fall along its predicted linear array.  Without some kind of
leverage on the case facts, the model cannot generate predictions
prospectively.
Because of this limitation of spatial voting models, we turned to clas-
sification tree analysis as a way to generate predictions from case-specific
information.48  Classification trees have been used in other contexts for
forecasting, and provide a flexible method for pattern finding in situa-
tions involving many variables.  They enabled us to capture patterns in
the Justices’ observable past behavior without assuming a linear relation-
ship between covariates and outcomes.  Using all of the potential vari-
ables and information about actual outcomes in the training data, we esti-
mated the classification trees that best fit the past cases.49  Interestingly,
48. There are other technologies that could be used to forecast Supreme Court
behavior.  One of particular note is the use of neural network models.  Our choice to use
classification trees is motivated by the transparency of the model; i.e., trees are produced
that can be graphically represented and easily studied.  See Appendix A.  Other
approaches tend to be more of a “black box,” and, as such, are very difficult to understand.
49. In brief, we started with a set of twenty-four potential models.  These models
differed from one another based on our choice of certain parameters—for example,
whether unanimous cases were forecast separately or not, and whether the individual
Justices’ votes were linked or independent.  We then split the pre-2002 data into two
mutually exclusive parts, which we refer to as the in-sample data and the out-of-sample
data.
For each potential model specification, we fit the model to the in-sample data, used it
to predict the out-of-sample decisions, and calculated the percentage that were correctly
predicted.  We chose as our forecasting model the model specification that did the best job
of classifying the out-of-sample decisions.  Thus, the model selected was the one that
maximized correct case outcome predictions, not correct vote predictions.  Finally, we fit
this model to the full pre-2002 data and then used it to forecast decisions in the October
2002 Term.  Although it would be possible to assign probabilities to different outcomes
(e.g., a 60% chance of affirmance), we treated the model’s forecasts as all having a
probability of one.  In other words, the model’s forecasts, like the experts’, were captured
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the final classification trees did not utilize all of the variables initially se-
lected.  Some simply “dropped out” of the trees, having no predictive
power.50  The six variables included in the model were retained simply
because they best fit the training data.
For each case pending before the Supreme Court during the 2002
Term, we coded the six variables used by the model and used them to
generate the machine’s forecasts.  The final model consisted of eleven
distinct classification trees.  The first two predict whether a case is likely
to be a unanimous “liberal” decision or a unanimous “conservative” deci-
sion.  These two trees were applied first for every case prediction, and the
process ended there if a unanimous result in one direction was predicted.
However, if neither of the first two trees predicted a unanimous decision
(or if both did, in opposite directions), then nine separate classification
trees—one to forecast the vote of each Justice—were utilized.  As an ex-
ample, Figure 1 presents the estimated classification tree that was used to
forecast the votes of Justice O’Connor.  Consider Grutter v. Bollinger,51 the
case challenging the constitutionality of Michigan Law School’s affirma-
tive action policy.  Proceeding to the first decision point in O’Connor’s
tree, the model (erroneously) forecasts a reversal because the lower court
decision was liberal.52  Had the lower court decision been conservative,
the case would have dropped to the next branch, which asked which cir-
cuit the case was from, and continued in like manner down the tree until
a final prediction emerged for O’Connor’s vote.
Appendix A contains diagrams of all eleven classification trees in the
statistical model.  The structures of these trees are interesting indepen-
dent of the outcome of the forecasting exercise.  A quick visual compari-
son reveals that the trees vary significantly from Justice to Justice.  Not
only do they differ in terms of their overall shape and the number of
branches they contain, but variables figuring prominently in the decision
tree of one Justice may be relatively unimportant or altogether absent in
another.
Some of the Justice-specific classification trees take into account the
predicted votes of other Justices.  For example, the statistical model’s
forecast of Justice Breyer’s vote depends on the predicted votes of Justices
O’Connor and Ginsburg in the same case,53 requiring that those two
as simple “affirm” or “reverse” predictions without attempting to assess the probability of
each possible outcome.
The twenty-four models we tested obviously do not exhaust the universe of possible
models.  Choosing different model parameters might produce more accurate forecasts.
Nevertheless, we decided to test a reasonable number of models, all of them plausible on
substantive grounds.  Our final statistical model is a product of those choices.
50. See supra note 47 (listing the ten variables considered, including the four that R
were ultimately discarded).
51. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
52. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002).
53. The relationships between the Justices that are visible in the classification trees
generate reasonably good predictions of the Justices’ votes because they capture
\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-4\COL401.txt unknown Seq: 17 30-APR-04 18:24
1166 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1150






























votes be predicted first.  Accordingly, the model generates predictions of
the Justices’ votes in a precise sequential order:  unanimous liberal out-
come, unanimous conservative outcome, Scalia, Thomas, Rehnquist, Ste-
vens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and then Kennedy.  Thus, Jus-
tice Scalia’s predicted vote on a case is generated before Justice
Thomas’s, whose predicted vote might vary based on the Scalia predic-
correlations in their behavior.  They should not be interpreted as claiming that one
Justice’s vote causes or motivates the behavior of another.
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tion.54  The model then uses the predicted vote of Justice Thomas as a
relevant variable in generating Justice Kennedy’s predicted outcome.55
Prior to oral argument, we posted the statistical model’s predictions
for each case on a project website.56  At the end of the Term, however, we
became aware of an error in the software code that was used to input the
case characteristics into the model.  As a result, several of the forecasts
originally posted on the website did not actually reflect the operation of
the model as written.  The programming error had the effect of misclassi-
fying some cases as they were run through the model’s decision trees, so
that, for example, a case from the Ninth Circuit was erroneously entered
into the model as if it had originated in the Fifth Circuit.  We corrected
that programming bug and regenerated all of the machine’s forecasts.57
As a result of correcting the programming error, the machine’s overall
predictive accuracy improved from 68% to 75%, but otherwise the basic
results were unchanged.58  This Essay reports and analyzes the forecasts
generated by the model operating with the corrected software.  We be-
lieve, however, that the potential for a programming error to affect out-
puts of machine-based prediction is itself worthy of note.  In this sense, a
stark contrast between “humans” and “a machine” is misleading.  The ma-
chine is itself a product of a series of choices made by humans, including
which variables to consider for inclusion, how to code them in particular
cases, and how to use them to generate outcomes.  The efficacy of the
machine ultimately depends on those human choices and remains vul-
nerable to them and the risk of human error.
C. The Legal Experts
The study’s other method of prediction seeks to capture the case-
specific judgments of a large number of legal experts.  Experts are distin-
guished from nonexperts by extensive training and experience in the rel-
evant domain.  In addition to greater specialized knowledge, experts have
the ability to perceive meaningful patterns and to structure their knowl-
edge on deeper, principle-based categories.  Often, their judgments are
54. See Figures 8 and 9 in Appendix A.
55. See Figure 16 in Appendix A.
56. See The Washington University Supreme Court Forecasting Project, at http://
wusct.wustl.edu (last updated Apr. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Project Website] (providing data
on the 2002 forecasts, as well as forecasts for the current 2003 Term).
57. The statistical model itself—that is, the classification trees—had not changed
since the start of the 2002 Term, nor had the manner in which the characteristics of the
pending cases were coded.  In most cases, the machine’s forecasts did not change,
although in seven cases the machine’s prediction switched from “affirm” to “reverse” when
the error was corrected, and in six cases the opposite occurred.
58. The website for this project includes a list of all the old, incorrect forecasts, as well
as more technical information about the programming error and computer code that can
be used to replicate all of the forecasts.  See Project Website, supra note 56 (click on R
hyperlinks available at http://wusct.wustl.edu/2002/errors/index.html).
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based on analyses that are qualitative in nature.  In each of these ways, the
judgments of our legal experts differed from that of the machine.
Because no metric exists to measure expertise precisely, we recruited
participants much the way anyone might look for expert assistance:  We
researched their writings, checked their training and experience, and re-
lied on our own personal knowledge and referrals from knowledgeable
colleagues in their fields.  The eighty-three individuals who participated
comfortably qualify as “experts,” having written and taught about, prac-
ticed before, and/or clerked at the Court, and having developed signifi-
cant expertise in one or more substantive fields of law.  Collectively, they
form an accomplished group of seventy-one academics and twelve appel-
late attorneys, comprised of thirty-eight former Supreme Court law
clerks, thirty-three chaired professors, and five current or former law
school deans.  The names of the participating experts are listed alphabeti-
cally in Appendix B.  We note with much gratitude that the experts’ par-
ticipation was an entirely volunteer effort, and their substantial intellec-
tual generosity made this project possible.
We asked experts to predict a case or cases within their areas of sub-
stantive expertise.59  More than one expert predicted most cases, but ex-
perts assigned to the same case did not communicate about their predic-
tions and were unaware of one another’s identity.  We requested their
forecasts prior to oral argument, and assured them that we would not
reveal their individual predictions or the cases to which they were as-
signed.  Experts were free to consider any sources of information or fac-
tors they thought relevant to making their prediction.60  In addition to an
“affirm” or “reverse” prediction for the Court as a whole and for each
Justice,61 some experts also offered brief written comments about the
case or their prediction.
59. To best match particular cases with particular expertise, and to avoid
overburdening our volunteer experts, we limited each participating expert to predicting
between one and three cases.  One expert predicted four cases.  We matched experts with
cases using an “issue preference form” that the experts completed.
60. We provided a copy of the lower court opinion and citations to the parties’
Supreme Court briefs, but did not limit the experts to these materials.
61. For those inclined to parse different legal questions differently (as most legal
academics and lawyers are), the requirement of a single “affirm” or “reverse” prediction
seems unrealistically simplistic.  Although this artificial bluntness understandably
frustrated some experts, we do not think it necessarily affected the comparative results.
Forcing a single binary choice essentially required the experts to decide which issue they
thought would be crucial to the Court’s decision, and to base their prediction in the case
on the outcome of that issue.  Some expert predictions might have been incorrect because
they misapprehended which issue would be crucial, even though they would have made a
correct prediction on another issue.  However, the model would be equally if not more
vulnerable to this risk, as it bases its predictions on general trends without any regard to
the specifics of the case.  And in some cases the experts could, and did, recognize specific
grounds for decision that were so particularized (and often technical) as to be absolutely
beyond the machine’s recognition.  See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
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By asking a group of legal experts to make predictions, we did not
expect to capture a single coherent theory of Supreme Court decision-
making.  Our experts are diverse in their experiences, areas of expertise
and philosophies.  We fully expected that they would differ in the factors
they thought important to consider, and in how they applied them in
particular cases.  Instead, what we sought was the best judgment of indi-
viduals with legal expertise—that is, those with the training and knowl-
edge to take account of specific legal factors, such as doctrine or text, to
the extent they thought appropriate, along with whatever other factors
they deemed relevant.  Although another group of experts might have
approached this task differently—and perhaps produced different re-
sults—this group certainly had the capacity and experience to assess
meaningfully a host of legal and nonlegal variables in making their
predictions.
Although it is impossible to trace precisely how the experts reached
their predictions, we obtained some information about the factors that
played a role in their decisionmaking process.  Upon receipt of an ex-
pert’s prediction in a particular case, we sent that expert a written survey
asking him or her to rate a list of factors that were important to his or her
prediction.62  The survey responses, together with their written com-
ments, offer a glimpse of how one cross-section of legal experts perceives
Supreme Court decisionmaking.63
D. The Court’s Decisions
Throughout the Term, we posted all of the machine and expert fore-
casts prior to oral argument on the project website.64  After each deci-
sion, we coded the actual outcome in each case and the vote of each
Justice as “affirm” or “reverse.”  In doing so, we focused on the bottom
line outcomes:  Cases that were vacated and remanded, or reversed even
in part, were coded as “reverse.”65  Concurring votes—even ones that dif-
62. Experts predicting more than one case received a survey for each case.  In all,
approximately 90% of our experts returned at least one survey, and we received responses
for 65% of the expert predictions made during the Term.  In order not to influence the
experts’ predictions by exposing them to the survey’s list of factors potentially influencing
the Court’s decision, we sent the surveys to each expert after receiving his or her
prediction in a particular case.  The downside to this choice was that it required experts to
recall their decisionmaking process after a week or two had passed.
63. Of course, these data are not direct evidence of their thought processes.
Problems of recall or unconscious biases might affect the accuracy of our experts’ self-
reports.  Nevertheless, some interesting patterns emerge from what the experts say were
the factors that influenced their predictions.
64. See Project Website, supra note 56.  As discussed supra Part II.B, some of the R
machine’s forecasts posted during the Term were incorrect due to a software error.  The
analysis reported here uses the corrected forecasts.
65. Obviously, not all reversals are equal from the perspective of future litigants or
even the parties themselves.  When the Supreme Court reverses and remands on narrow
grounds, the petitioner may win temporarily but end up losing the case after the new legal
standard is applied.  For example, in Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003), the Court
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fered dramatically in terms of rationale—were treated the same.  For in-
stance, Justice O’Connor’s vote in Lawrence v. Texas was coded “reverse,”
just like the votes of the five Justices joining the majority opinion, even
though she advocated reversal on quite different grounds.66
Using these criteria, the coding decision was straightforward in most
cases.  However, we excluded several cases in which no opinion was is-
sued, or for which the outcome could not fairly be characterized in sim-
ple “affirm” or “reverse” terms.67  In all, we used sixty-eight cases to ana-
lyze the case outcome forecasts and sixty-seven to analyze individual vote
predictions.68  Appendix C lists the machine and expert predictions and
the actual outcomes for some of the major cases last Term.  Predictions
and outcomes for all of the cases included in our analysis are available on
the project website.69
reversed the Eighth Circuit order permitting Sell’s involuntary medication to render him
competent to stand trial, but it did not prohibit such practices outright; the Court’s
decision left room for the government to try again on remand in accordance with the
factors the Court announced.  See id. at 2187.  Despite the fact that Sell did not get the
blanket prohibition he sought, we focus on the result at the Supreme Court level and code
the outcome “reverse.”
66. See 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the
Court as to result but grounding her rationale in the Equal Protection Clause and not the
Due Process Clause).
67. Of the seventy-six cases in which the Court heard oral argument, we excluded
eight from our analysis.  We excluded three cases because they were dismissed without
opinion, see Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003); Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 537 U.S. 88
(2002); Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley, 537 U.S. 1 (2002), and two because they were
affirmed by an evenly divided Court, with no information about individual votes, see Dow
Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 124 S. Ct. 429 (2003); Borden Ranch P’ship v. United States
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 537 U.S. 99 (2002).
We excluded three additional cases due to intractable coding ambiguities.  Virginia v.
Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003), involved several different defendants and substantive issues.
Because different majorities of the Justices affirmed and reversed on the different issues,
the case as a whole is impossible to categorize as either an “affirm” or “reverse.”  We also
excluded Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003), and National Park
Hospitality Ass’n v. Department of Interior, 123 S. Ct. 2026 (2003), because in each case,
the Court’s decision turned on a preliminary issue.  In Green Tree, the Court vacated and
remanded, stating that whether the arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration must
first be resolved by the arbitrator.  See 123 S. Ct. at 2405.  In National Park Hospitality, the
Court also vacated and remanded, holding that the controversy was not yet ripe for judicial
resolution.  See 123 S. Ct. at 2028.  Although technically each decision would be a
“reversal” under our definition, the import of these decisions favored the respondents’
positions, such that neither “affirm” nor “reverse” accurately captures the true outcome.
68. We excluded Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003), from our vote analysis
only.  In that case, coding the votes of individual Justices is impossible due to strategic
concurrences (to form a Court judgment to vacate and remand) by Justices who stated that
their substantive position was to affirm.  No matter how we treat these ambiguous votes, the
overall “reverse” outcome of the case is not in question, so we do include Chavez in our
outcome analysis.  We do not include it in our vote analysis, leaving sixty-seven cases where
we summarize results for individual votes.
69. See Project Website, supra note 56. R
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III. RESULTS
Comparing the accuracy of the two methods, the statistical model
clearly did better than the legal experts in predicting case outcomes.  In
this section, we explain and analyze this basic outcome, breaking down
the results by Justice, by issue area, and by type of legal expert.  Part IV
explores the implications of these results in greater detail.
A. The Basic Results:  This Round to the Machine
The statistical model substantially outperformed the legal experts in
forecasting case outcomes in the 2002 Term.  As seen in Table 1, the
machine correctly forecast 75% of ultimate case outcomes, while the ex-
perts’ predictions were accurate only 59.1% of the time.70  This differ-
ence between the machine and the experts in forecasting outcomes
across all kinds of cases is statistically significant, even given the relatively
small number of cases in the sample.  A different result might well obtain
in a different Term with the same or a different group of experts, but for
this set of cases, the statistical model clearly performed better than the
experts.
TABLE 1:  MACHINE AND EXPERT FORECASTS OF CASE OUTCOMES FOR
DECIDED CASES (N=68).  ROW PERCENTAGES ARE IN PARENTHESES.  THE
ESTIMATED (CONDITIONAL MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD) ODDS RATIO IS 2.073
(P=0.025, FISHER’S EXACT TEST).
Case Outcome Forecast
Correct Incorrect Total
Machine 51 (75.0%) 17 (25.0%) 68 (100.0%)
Experts 101 (59.1%) 70 (40.9%) 171 (100.0%)
Table 1 treats each expert independently, summarizing the results by
aggregating all available expert predictions.  However, we had three ex-
perts predict most of the cases, with a view to isolating outlier expert pre-
dictions and capturing a majority, or consensus, expert prediction on
most cases.  Thus, an alternative measure of the experts’ success takes the
predictions of the majority of experts on a particular case as the experts’
consensus prediction.  Use of this measure improved the experts’ success
70. Several of the expert forecasts were ambiguous due to narrative comments written
on the ballot indicating different predictions on different legal issues in the case, or
specifying that the prediction only applied to a single issue in a multi-issue case.  We coded
these ballots according to the first written prediction on the ballot, and included them in
the reported results.  We also performed the analysis without including these predictions.
The substantive results are not affected.  For reasons we explained in note 59, we believe
that forcing the experts to make a single binary choice as to outcomes was unlikely to bias
the results vis-a`-vis the model.
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rate somewhat.  In the cases with a unanimous or majority consensus re-
sult, the experts’ accuracy rate was 65.6%.71
Using the consensus predictions narrows the gap between the two
methods,72 but the basic result—the statistical model outperforms the ex-
perts—still obtains.  The fact that the consensus predictions do not close
the gap suggests that the experts’ lower accuracy rate compared with the
machine is not attributable to a handful of idiosyncratic expert predic-
tions.  Rather, the different success rates likely reflect systematic differ-
ences in the two methods of prediction—differences which we explore in
greater detail in Part IV.
We also compared the success of the two methods in the Term’s
thirty-one unanimous cases.  Many of the Court’s closely divided cases in-
volve ambiguous text and doctrine or divisive policy issues—it is not sur-
prising that legal experts would have a hard time predicting those.  But if
some cases are decided unanimously because the relevant law is more
determinate, then we might expect that experts trained to analyze legal
arguments would outperform a model that is indifferent to specific doc-
trine and text.  That did not happen with the Term’s unanimous cases:
Although the experts’ success rate increased—to 65.3%—it remained be-
hind the machine’s 74.2%.73  The fact that the machine’s accuracy rate
was marginally less, and the experts’ only slightly greater in these cases
suggests that the unanimous decisions that in hindsight look like “easy
cases” are not obviously predictable prospectively.
B. Predicting the Justices Who Matter Most
Whether comparing aggregate expert predictions, consensus predic-
tions, or only forecasts in the unanimous cases, the statistical model con-
sistently outperformed the legal experts in predicting case outcomes.
Perhaps surprising, then, is the fact that the model did slightly worse than
the experts at forecasting the specific votes of the Justices in the Term’s
cases.  Table 2 illustrates that the experts correctly predicted 67.9% of the
Justices’ individual votes during the Term, while the model lagged a bit
71. Cases with only two experts with opposite predictions were inconclusive.  We
excluded these cases altogether in calculating the 65.6% accuracy rate.  Alternatively, we
could have treated these inconclusives as incorrect (resulting in a 58.8% success rate for
the experts) or assumed that if a third prediction had been obtained, the distribution of
correct predictions would mirror the overall distribution of correct expert predictions
(resulting in a 64.7% success rate).
72. The Condorcet Jury Theorem suggests that, on average, expert opinion
aggregated in this fashion will outperform individual predictions.  Consistent with the
Theorem, the data suggest that experts do better when their votes are aggregated.
Presumably, aggregating the predictions of greater numbers of legal experts would
produce even better results.  But arguably, the expert predictions should be treated
independently, as the machine, at least in this project, was limited to a single predictive
iteration.
73. This variance between the model and the experts is not statistically significant
given the small number of unanimous results—thirty-one.
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behind at 66.7%.  Although the model and the experts did about equally
well in predicting individual votes overall, on this Supreme Court not all
votes are of equal importance in determining outcomes.  Because the
model did particularly well in predicting the centrist Justices who matter
the most, it did significantly better at forecasting case outcomes.
TABLE 2:  MACHINE AND EXPERT FORECASTS OF JUSTICE VOTES FOR
DECIDED CASES (N=67).  ROW PERCENTAGES ARE IN PARENTHESES.  SOME
JUSTICES DID NOT VOTE ON SOME CASES, AND ARE THUS NOT INCLUDED.
THE ESTIMATED (CONDITIONAL MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD) ODDS RATIO IS
0.943 (P=0.571, FISHER’S EXACT TEST).
Justice Vote Forecast
Correct Incorrect Total
Machine 400 (66.7%) 200 (33.3%) 600 (100.0%)
Experts 1015 (67.9%) 479 (32.1%) 1494 (100.0%)
The machine and the experts varied considerably in the accuracy of
their forecasts for different Justices.  Figure 2 graphs the proportion of
correctly predicted votes by the machine and the experts for each individ-
ual Justice.  As is apparent, the experts did worst at predicting Justice
O’Connor’s votes among all the Justices, and considerably worse than the
machine.  That the legal experts found Justice O’Connor difficult to pre-
dict is not surprising—she is widely viewed as an enigmatic moderate by
observers of the Court.74  What is surprising is that the statistical model
was able to correctly predict O’Connor’s votes 70% of the time.  Thus,
the model seems to have captured patterns in her decisional behavior
that the experts did not recognize.
Figure 2 also clearly demonstrates that the experts did better at pre-
dicting the Justices at the opposite ends of the Court’s ideological spec-
trum.  Figure 2 arrays the Justices along the vertical axis in order of in-
creasing conservatism as estimated for the 2001 Term by Martin and
Quinn.75  The proportion of correct predictions forms a sideways V-
shape, indicating that the experts were most accurate at predicting the
votes of the most ideologically extreme Justices, and were least successful
at forecasting the votes of the centrist Justices.  Relying solely on the Jus-
tices’ ideology to predict outcomes would likely produce a similar pat-
74. See, e.g., Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States?:  Invalidation of State
Action During the Rehnquist Era, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1301, 1345 (2002) (“Our data . . . support
the commonly held view that Justice O’Connor is a moderate swing voter who cannot be
described in predictable ideological terms.”); Linda Greenhouse, Between Certainty &
Doubt:  States of Mind on the Supreme Court Today, 6 Green Bag 2d 241, 247 (2003)
(describing O’Connor as “one of the Court’s leading minimalists”).
75. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 29.  We suspect that most legal academics would R
generally agree with this lineup.
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tern, suggesting that the legal experts view the Court in part in attitudinal
terms.  It is also possible that some other factor—perhaps some Justices’
clear judicial philosophies or interpretive theories—aligns with this ap-
parently liberal/conservative axis, making it easier for legal experts to
predict the actions of the Justices on the extreme ends.76  Figure 2 also
reveals that the statistical model was much better at predicting the votes
of the conservative Justices than it was with the more liberal Justices.  Be-
cause the experts did much better than the machine at predicting the
votes of Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter, the overall accuracy of the
two methods across all the Justices was about the same.  However, given
76. As discussed in Part IV below, the survey responses indicate that the policy
preferences and judicial ideologies of the Justices were important factors in the experts’
predictions, but so, too, were factors like Court precedent, statutory text, and the practical
consequences of the decision.
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the current composition of the Court, predicting the votes of the five
conservative Justices correctly is apparently more important for getting
the overall result right.  An examination of the direction of the error
rates reinforces this point.  Both the machine and the experts over-
predicted conservative outcomes, but a greater proportion of the ma-
chine’s errors were in a conservative direction.77  Despite, or perhaps be-
cause of, this conservative bias, the machine proved significantly more
accurate in forecasting case outcomes.
C. Different Issue Types, Different Results
We also parsed our results by issue area.  In doing so, we used the
issue area codes assigned by Spaeth in his Supreme Court database.78
These issue area categories may seem awkward or even arbitrary from a
legal perspective, as they do not neatly track traditional doctrinal catego-
ries.  Nevertheless, Spaeth’s coding protocol is well-defined, and his issue
area labels have been widely used by political scientists.  More impor-
tantly, our statistical model utilized Spaeth’s coding protocol to deter-
mine issue area codes for input into the classification trees.  Thus, they
provide a useful starting point for analysis.
Figures 3 and 4 display the proportion of correctly predicted case
outcomes and Justice votes for issue areas with five or more cases in our
sample.  These figures suggest that the relative success of the two meth-
ods varies significantly depending upon the issue area.  Given the small
number of cases in each category, these comparisons are obviously quite
sensitive to the category definitions and the coding decisions in individ-
ual cases.  Nevertheless, striking deviations occurred in the judicial power
and economic activity cases.  The substantial variations from one issue
area to another suggest that one method or the other may have a compar-
ative advantage in predicting certain types of cases.
In the judicial power cases, the experts did significantly better than
the machine, both in predicting case outcomes and individual votes.  In
these cases, the experts correctly predicted 73.7% of outcomes and 76.0%
of the Justices’ votes, compared with accuracy rates of 50% and 37.5%
respectively for the model.
Cases in the economic activity category present the opposite picture.
In this issue area, the machine’s rate of correct outcome forecasts—
87.5%—far exceeded that of the experts, who accurately predicted only
77. Of the cases misclassified by the machine, 18.7% were conservative outcomes that
the machine had predicted would be liberal outcomes, and 81.3% were liberal outcomes
that the machine had predicted would be conservative.  For the experts, the figures were
33.8% and 66.2%, respectively.
78. For decades, Harold Spaeth, a leading political science scholar of the Court, has
classified every Supreme Court decision by, among other things, subject matter.  He
utilizes some 260 categories, which are in turn grouped into thirteen major categories.  By
“issue area” we refer to these thirteen broad categories as captured in the variable
“VALUE” in Spaeth’s database.  See Spaeth, Documentation, supra note 45, at 41.
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FIGURE 3:  MACHINE AND EXPERT FORECASTS OF CASE OUTCOMES FOR
DECIDED CASES, SELECTED BY ISSUE AREA.  THE ISSUE CATEGORIES ARE:
CIVIL RIGHTS (N=14), CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (N=14), ECONOMIC ACTIVITY














51.3% of the cases.  Remarkable from a legal perspective is the widely
varying subject matter of the cases encompassed within the “economic
activity” issue area.  The implications of the model’s success across such a
diverse doctrinal grouping and the experts’ success in the judicial power
cases is explored below in Part IV.
D. Attorneys and Academics
This study was designed to compare the predictive accuracy of a sta-
tistical model with a group of legal experts.  In the analysis above, we
treated all legal experts the same, although they have differing back-
grounds and professional experiences.  This group of experts included
twelve specialized appellate attorneys in addition to seventy-one legal aca-
demics, and nearly half had experience clerking at the Supreme Court.
These numbers are too small, and our method of case assignment within
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FIGURE 4:  MACHINE AND EXPERT FORECASTS OF JUDICIAL VOTES FOR
DECIDED CASES, SELECTED BY ISSUE AREA.  THE ISSUE CATEGORIES ARE:
CIVIL RIGHTS (N=14), CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (N=14), ECONOMIC ACTIVITY














the expert pool too unsystematic,79 to produce firm conclusions about
differences between types of experts.  Nonetheless, two findings are worth
noting—the first for how much accuracy variation existed, the second for
how little difference emerged.  The small group of appellate attorneys
did much better at forecasting cases than the academics, but—contrary to
our hypothesis—those experts who had clerked at the Supreme Court,
even fairly recently, did not demonstrate greater accuracy than the ex-
perts at large.  Figure 5 displays these internal points of comparison
within the expert group.
The legal academics and practicing attorneys in our pool of experts
differed markedly in the accuracy of their predictions.  The legal academ-
ics forecast 53% of their cases correctly, while the attorneys were correct
79. We did not distribute the relevant categories of expert—Supreme Court clerks
versus non-Supreme Court clerks, academics versus attorneys—randomly across types of
cases.
\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-4\COL401.txt unknown Seq: 29 30-APR-04 18:24
1178 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1150
FIGURE 5:  PROPORTION CORRECT EXPERT FORECASTS OF CASE OUTCOMES
BY EXPERT BACKGROUND.  THE FIGURE IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING
FORECASTS:  145 FORECASTS BY ACADEMICS; 26 BY PRACTICING ATTORNEYS;
84 BY EXPERTS WHO CLERKED FOR THE SUPREME COURT; 87 BY NON-
SUPREME COURT CLERKS; AND 34 FORECASTS BY EXPERTS WHO CLERKED














92% of the time.  This sharp difference in accuracy should be interpreted
cautiously, as there were only twelve attorneys among our pool of eighty-
three experts.  Moreover, the process of matching experts and cases may
have disproportionately assigned the attorneys to the more straightfor-
ward cases.  Because of this concern, we excluded the “judicial power”
cases (where the experts generally did very well) from the analysis, but
the performance gap between the attorneys and the academics remained
about the same.80  Although a more systematic comparative study might
not produce such a large gap, it is plausible that the two groups actually
differ in their predictive accuracy.  The practicing attorneys who partici-
pated in this project are appellate lawyers who appear regularly before
the Supreme Court.  Prediction of Supreme Court outcomes, in order to
advise clients and develop litigation strategies, is an important element of
their professional role.  By contrast, for most legal academics, even those
80. The adjusted accuracy rate was 94.4% for the attorneys and 53.7% for the
academics.
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whose scholarship centers on the Supreme Court, forecasting cases is a
minor component of their work—both in terms of time and
importance.81
We similarly expected to see a difference in predictive accuracy be-
tween nonclerks and former Supreme Court clerks, or at least for those
who clerked within the last ten to fifteen years for one of the currently
sitting Justices.  The year spent inside the Court might, we thought, con-
fer a more nuanced understanding of the Justices’ preferences and legal
philosophies that might aid in prediction.  Roughly half of the participat-
ing experts clerked for a Justice on the Supreme Court, and of those,
twenty-one clerked for a Justice on this current Court.  Our data do not
show any clear difference between these groups of experts:  Former Su-
preme Court clerks predicted 61% of cases correctly, compared with 57%
for nonclerks.  The subcategory of “clerk, currently sitting Justice” got
54% of case outcomes correct.  Just as with the attorney/academic com-
parison, we did not design the project to assess this intragroup difference
and so this finding is extremely tentative.
IV. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This project, which centers on the comparative prediction of Su-
preme Court outcomes, began with a different kind of prediction made
in a faculty lounge months before the October 2002 Term began.  The
two law professor authors (Ruger and Kim) on this study listened to the
two political science authors (Martin and Quinn) present their findings
from a retrospective empirical analysis of Court decisions.  The work was
illuminating and rigorous, but we were skeptical about the utility of a
model that left out so much legal and factual nuance in its analysis of
cases.  Our prediction at the time, which developed into this study, was
that a sophisticated group of legal experts could forecast outcomes in
specific cases more accurately than a statistical model that failed to take
into account particular legal text or doctrine.
By now it is evident that our initial prediction was wrong, at least with
respect to this iteration of the experiment.  Although a different outcome
81. This variance in expert performance underscores one limitation in placing too
much weight on the comparative nature of this study.  We assembled a group with
expertise in the substantive law that comes before the Supreme Court; we did not
necessarily assemble a group of Supreme Court prediction experts.  Many of the experts who
are well-accomplished in analyzing the Court’s work expressly disclaimed any particular
predictive ability.  It might be possible, with sufficient focus and enough trial and error, to
assemble a different group of legal experts in future Terms who would perform as well as,
or better than, a statistical model such as this one.  The comparative results from the 2002
Term are worthy of notice, and perhaps reaffirm that Supreme Court prediction is no easy
task, but many of the general implications we discuss in the next Part would apply even if
the forecasting results of the two methods were much closer.  The fact remains that a
model that was purposely blinded to specific doctrine and text predicted 75% of case
outcomes accurately, and this result is interesting even independent of the experts’
performance.
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might obtain in another round, the model’s success in predicting the
2002 Term is impressive, and has forced us to reassess our thoughts about
the potential benefits and implications of such a generalized model of
Supreme Court voting.  With our skepticism significantly dispelled, we
now shift from speculating how a machine that is blinded to doctrinal,
textual, and procedural particularity would do poorly at predicting cases,
to asking why it did so well—from assumptions about the particulars the
machine misses to curiosity about the underlying generalities it appears
to have captured.  What did the model recognize about the patterns of
the Justices’ behavior that the experts did not?  And what does this tell us
about how we might better observe and understand Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking?  We discuss a few more specific implications of this study
first before considering these broader questions.
A. Practical Applications and Limitations
The Supreme Court is a critical institution in American society, and
its decisions have wide ramifications on a host of social, political, and
economic areas.  Those who have an interest in Court outcomes—
whether that interest is personal, professional, financial, or intellectual—
would have interest in a machine that could do well at predicting out-
comes.  This notion is obvious and almost tautological:  Those who would
like to predict Supreme Court outcomes would have an interest in a ma-
chine that does predict them, and that interest would presumably in-
crease with the model’s accuracy rate.  This last point compels an impor-
tant qualifier about the model’s utility for predicting actual outcomes:  It
does well at assessing probable outcomes across a diverse array of cases, but
it does not achieve certainty or anything close to it—the model missed a
quarter of the case outcomes in the 2002 Term.82  Moreover, as this itera-
tion of the experiment showed, the model’s outputs themselves are po-
tentially subject to human error manifested in programming errors or
data input mistakes.83  Accordingly, we suspect that a general predictive
model would be of some use to those with specific interests in case out-
comes, but would only complement, and not replace, the tools that attor-
neys and others currently use to assess probable results.  For potential
litigants, the analogy might be to the techniques of scientific jury re-
82. Considering that the Supreme Court reverses more often than it affirms, a naı¨ve
model might predict a reversal in every case.  For the 2002 Term, such a model would have
achieved a 72% accuracy rate, one almost as good as our statistical model.  In other recent
Terms, however, such a “reverse” model would have been less successful:  The aggregate
reversal rate for all argued cases in the ten terms preceding the October 2002 Term was
63%, and in only two of those ten terms did the reversal rate exceed 70% (1996 and 2001).
The low point over the preceding decade in terms of reversal rate was the October 1993
Term, where the Court reversed in only 51% of the cases it heard argued.  Reversal rates
were generated from data available in Spaeth’s Supreme Court database, see supra note 45.
83. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the particular R
programming bug that occurred last Term.
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search, which is used as background by many litigants with sufficient re-
sources, although ultimate juror selection choices are made by attorneys.
One clear limitation of this model’s general predictive power is that
it corresponds to this specific group of Justices on the Supreme Court.
The model succeeded to the extent that it did because it was able to dis-
cern meaningful patterns in the past voting behavior of these nine Jus-
tices that correlated reasonably well with future votes.  This achievement
was facilitated by the existence, rare in American history, of over 600 deci-
sions from the same nine Justices sitting together since 1994.  A change in
the Court’s composition would make the model-building process much
more difficult.  Certainly a new Justice’s decision tree would differ from
the retiring one.  Moreover, a change in the Court’s personnel would
likely affect the behavior of the holdover Justices as well.  In the current
model some of the Justices’ decision trees are expressly dependent upon
the predicted votes of other sitting Justices.  Not only would those trees
have to be re-estimated, but the strategic environment in which each Jus-
tice votes would likely shift, such that their past behavior might no longer
provide a good guide to their future behavior.
There are additional challenges to creating a successful model of this
sort to predict outcomes in the federal circuit courts, where the rotating
panel system might confound ready model-building.  This model de-
pends on the ability to observe voting coalitions in a large number of
cases.  On a court where panel composition—and therefore, the judges’
strategic environment—varies, such patterns might be more difficult to
capture.  Moreover, the observable variables that proved useful for pre-
dicting Supreme Court outcomes in this model are themselves keyed to
features of the appeals court ruling (e.g., “circuit of origin,” “direction of
circuit court decision”).  Creation of a model to predict lower court deci-
sions would require identification of different ex ante predictors.
In addition, a more fundamental feature of Supreme Court decision-
making may limit the applicability of this type of predictive model to
other courts.  The statistical model is intentionally ignorant of the partic-
ularities of doctrine and text (note that we do not say it is ignorant of
“law”—this is a different question discussed below).  A predictive method
that ignores specific text and doctrine might be expected to do relatively
well—especially when compared with the predictions of experts trained
in interpreting doctrine and text—in a decisional setting where those
specific commands are relatively ambiguous.  Cases before the Supreme
Court are typically those that present novel factual situations or in which
persuasive legal authority exists on both sides.  Because the law in these
cases is more ambiguous, and therefore less constraining, than at the trial
or circuit court level, forecasting Supreme Court decisionmaking likely
involves significantly different considerations than predicting outcomes
elsewhere in the legal system.  It may well turn out that taking account of
specific legal arguments is more important for accurate forecasting of
trial and circuit court decisions.
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B. Different Blindness, Different Vision
This study compares two very different methods for predicting Su-
preme Court behavior.  One method—the statistical model—is quite ob-
viously blinded to a host of case-specific considerations that might aid
prediction.  Another glance at the trees in Appendix A confirms this—
not only is the model oblivious to legal nuance, it also ignores the specific
facts and procedural posture of the cases.  The model is thus bound to
miss a significant number of cases every Term where specific legal and
factual idiosyncracies push the Justices outside of the normal patterns
that the model captures.  The judicial power cases are most likely exam-
ples of this.
As discussed in Part III, the experts substantially outperformed the
model in predicting both case outcomes and votes in the judicial power
cases.  The cases in this category84 generally involved technical issues of
procedure in which the rule of decision was unlikely to directly implicate
broad policy debates outside the legal system.  In such situations, the le-
gal experts arguably have a comparative advantage over the machine.  For
example, in Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc.,85 all three experts cor-
rectly predicted a 9-0 affirmance, while the machine predicted a 5-4 rever-
sal.  This case raised the question of whether statutory language confer-
ring concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts barred removal to
federal court of an action initiated by the plaintiff in state court.
Cases like Breuer, more than most, likely turn on highly particular-
ized features of the case—perhaps conventional “legal” factors such as
statutory text and stare decisis—that the experts were able to recognize
and incorporate into their decisionmaking process.  In fact, survey re-
sponses in the judicial power cases had a markedly different profile.  Ex-
perts in these cases indicated that the Justices’ policy preferences and
ideology played a relatively lesser role, and statutory text a greater role, in
their predictions than for expert respondents in last Term’s cases taken
as a whole.  The machine, limited to the gross features of the case, likely
missed the very specific factors on which these outcomes turned.  In fact,
two of the experts explained their predictions in Breuer by pointing to
several highly specific features of the case, none of which could possibly
be captured by the sorts of variables utilized by the statistical model.86
84. The eight judicial power cases include Nguyen v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2130
(2003) (consolidated with Phan v. United States); Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 123
S. Ct. 2058 (2003); Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1882 (2003); Roell
v. Withrow, 123 S. Ct. 1696 (2003); Jinks v. Richland County, 123 S. Ct. 1667 (2003); Dole
Food Co. v. Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655 (2003); United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002);
and Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002).
85. 123 S. Ct. 1882.
86. One expert wrote:
The question presented seems straightforward and the opinion below seems
correct.  The Court granted expedited review for this case and no other out of
nine cases in which it granted cert. in the same day.  This could suggest that the
Court regards this as a simple case to brief, argue and decide.
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Despite the experts’ success in the judicial power cases, the model
was more accurate across a broad range of cases.  Although the machine
could not account for and process certain bits of specific information,
there are likely countervailing limitations on individual experts’ ability to
assess and process all the various types of information available to them.87
This might be manifested in at least two ways.  First, experts might over-
emphasize analysis of specific doctrine and text which—although impor-
tant—might not alone offer the best guide to predicting the close cases
the Supreme Court considers.  Second, when experts do look beyond le-
gal doctrine and text to consider other factors in prediction, the limits of
human cognition may make it difficult to recognize and correctly assess
the broader patterns that correlate with the Justices’ decisions.
On the first point, it is clear that the experts took into account spe-
cific legal considerations that the machine ignored.  When asked “in mak-
ing your prediction, what sources of information did you consult?” they
overwhelmingly pointed to traditional legal materials, such as court deci-
sions, statutes, and the briefs in the case.88  When specifically asked about
traditional legal factors such as precedent and statutory text, significant
majorities of the expert responses rated them important factors in their
decisions.  For example, 69% of expert responses rated as important “Su-
preme Court precedent on point” in the cases in which such authority
existed.89  Similarly, in cases in which it was relevant, 54% of expert re-
sponses indicated that statutory text was an important factor in their
prediction.
However, doctrine and text may be uniquely indeterminate grounds
for predicting Supreme Court decisions given that institution’s case selec-
tion criteria and its place in the American judicial hierarchy.90  Most of
the issues the Court hears have already been decided in contrary ways by
panels of lower court judges, and there is no higher judicial authority to
The other expert explained:
I am influenced by the position of the United States supporting affirmance, the
clear federal interest at stake, and the absence of good reasons of policy for these
cases to be left in state court at the discretion of the plaintiff.  The strength of
those considerations, I think, will overwhelm the predilections of some of the
Justices against removal.
87. One obvious limitation is time.  Given the uncompensated nature of the task and
the competing demands on their time, different experts likely devoted different amounts
of time and attention to their prediction efforts.  It is quite possible that the amount of
time and attention devoted to the task affected the accuracy of the predictions.  We simply
had no way of either controlling or measuring the level of effort invested by individual
experts.
88. Virtually every one of the expert responses to this particular question cited these
types of legal materials.  Somewhat less frequently, they also reported that they had read
scholarly commentary or spoken with colleagues before reaching their prediction.
89. See Appendix D.
90. To the extent that this is true, the fact that most of our participants are experts on
the law, not the Court, may have contributed to the experts’ relatively poorer showing
overall.
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ensure compliance with a particular interpretive regime.91  The Court’s
cases are typically “hard” cases, for which precedent and legal text offer
ambiguous or conflicting answers.  It is hardly surprising in this context
that doctrine and text would be unreliable cues for prediction.  Karl Llew-
ellyn stressed these limitations of doctrine in making predictions of fu-
ture behavior, saying of legal scholars:
Our own blindness is the correlative blindness of the insider.
We insist, even among ourselves, on treating the cases primarily
as repositories of doctrine.  They are that, and of course we
need both to know it and to use our skills in the refining of that
ore.  But opinion by opinion . . . case by case, the reports offer
vastly more than data about the prevailing rules of law.92
Llewellyn’s insight—that court decisions reflect more than just “the
prevailing rules of law”—is now accepted by many in the legal academy.
However, merely recognizing that other, nonlegal factors matter is insuf-
ficient to produce consistently accurate prediction.  Consider how the ex-
perts applied presumptions about the Justices ideological preferences in
making predictions.  Judicial ideology was important for many experts
relative to many case predictions.  Substantial majorities—65% and
54.2% respectively—of expert responses rated the “policy preferences of
the Justices” and “the conservative or liberal ideologies of the individual
Justices” as important factors in their forecasts.  As revealing as what the
experts said in this regard is what they actually did in predicting individ-
ual Justice’s votes.  As discussed in Part III, the experts’ accuracy rate by
individual Justice was markedly higher at the ends of the Court’s ideologi-
cal spectrum than it was in the middle, producing the neat sideways V-
shaped curve visible in Figure 2, a pattern consistent with traditional atti-
tudinal assumptions.
That the legal experts have difficulty with Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy is hardly surprising.  Some Justices have articulated clear inter-
pretive philosophies that give strong cues about their votes even in close
cases.  The moderate Justices, however, often appear to observers to rely
on narrower, idiosyncratic, and case-specific rationales.  One leading le-
gal scholar has characterized the center of the current Court as “minimal-
ist,” maintaining that the Justices at “the analytical heart of the current
Court [ ] have adopted no ‘theory’ of constitutional interpretation.”93
Justice O’Connor presents particular problems in this regard—her cen-
tral role on the current Court is widely regarded as important but also as
91. This is not to say specific law is irrelevant or unimportant, merely that it is often
ambiguous.
92. Llewellyn, Common Law Tradition, supra note 26, at 355–56. R
93. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court: 1995 Term—Foreword:  Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 14 (1996) (emphasis omitted) (enumerating
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsberg as the minimalist Justices); see also Cass
R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time:  Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 8–10 (1999)
(explaining that minimalism seeks to avoid “broad rules and abstract theories,” instead
going only as far as “necessary to resolve a particular dispute”).
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enigmatic and unpredictable by many observers.94  The prediction results
suggest that the experts relied on highly general attitudinal assumptions
to supplement their assessment of legal factors, but such blunt attitudinal
assumptions are of limited utility in predicting the center of the Court.
What is needed is a more systematic and nuanced recognition of the vot-
ing patterns of the moderate Justices, and this is difficult for human ex-
perts to discern from case-by-case analysis.
This point applies more broadly to factors beyond merely law or ide-
ology.  The experts’ decisionmaking processes are most accurately char-
acterized as heterogeneous and multi-factorial.  The experts relied on a
variety of different factors, to differing degrees across experts and cases.
Seven of the listed factors were rated as important in a majority of expert
responses.95  However, a great deal of individual variation existed in how
various factors were weighted.  Almost all of the listed factors—twenty-
three of twenty-six—were rated “very important” by one or more ex-
perts,96 and their handwritten comments reported additional factors that
influenced their predictions, such as the unique facts of a case, observed
trends in a particular area of the law, or the Court’s overall reversal rate.
Moreover, the same expert, asked to predict outcomes in different cases,
weighted the various factors differently, sometimes rating a factor such as
precedent or ideology as “not at all important” in one case and “very
important” in the next.97  Thus, rather than utilizing a uniform set of
decision criteria, the experts appeared to take into account a large num-
ber of factors, giving them varying weight depending upon the particular
facts of each case.
We initially thought that this ability to consider multiple factors in
individualized ways would help the experts’ performance, but that appar-
94. See Colker & Scott, supra note 74, at 1345 (noting that O’Connor is “a moderate
swing voter who cannot be described in predictable ideological terms”); Mark A. Graber,
Rethinking Equal Protection in Dark Times, 4 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 314, 328 (2002)
(describing “[t]he minimalism of Justice O’Connor and, to a lesser extent, Justice
Kennedy”); Merrill, supra note 38, at 629 n.228 (observing that O’Connor is “likely to be
the median voter in contested cases”).
95. These seven factors are listed in bold in the table summarizing the survey results.
See Appendix D.  Of the seven, some are clearly legal and others reflect attitudinal
assumptions, but two factors are not easily classified.  The “interpretive theories of the
Justices” could be viewed merely as heuristics that help them reach their desired policy
outcomes, or, alternatively, as philosophies adopted for reasons internal to the law that
potentially constrain the Justices from pursuing naked preferences.  Similarly, the
“practical consequences of the decision” seems to encompass both the real world policy
implications of a decision, as well as more limited effects confined to the legal system itself.
Interestingly, some factors that the experts generally did not believe to be important—
such as the preferences of Congress or the Executive Branch—were identified in the
literature as affecting the Court’s strategic environment.  See Appendix D.
96. See id.
97. The varying weights reflect the experts’ judgments about which factors matter for
that particular case.  For example, one expert, correctly predicting a 9-0 reversal in
Massaro v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 1690 (2003), wrote, “I think this is a case where
practicalities, as reflected in prior U.S. position, will trump ideological predispositions.”
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ently did not happen across the board.  Rather than conferring an advan-
tage, perhaps the experts’ ability to consider highly particularized infor-
mation interfered with their predictive success.  Considerable research in
cognitive psychology has demonstrated the limits of human cognition.98
People often make poorer rather than better decisions when confronted
with more information, because they may shift to simpler, less accurate
decision strategies, or may become distracted by less relevant informa-
tion.99  Experts are also vulnerable to these effects.100  Moreover, like all
humans, experts are beset by various biases—such as availability biases or
confirmation biases—that affect their judgments.101  The use of heuris-
tics, though adaptive over the long run, may lead to poor judgments in
particular cases.  Especially in situations like this—involving large
amounts of information and multiple relevant factors—cognitive limits
may hamper the experts’ ability to systematically analyze and account for
the impact of multiple relevant factors.
C. Finding “Reckonability” Without Reference to Doctrine and Text
The experts’ close attention to legal doctrine turned out to be insuf-
ficient to predict reliably the Court’s decisions.  For all the insight to be
gained from careful reading of cases, such attention to the details of doc-
trine and text may blind legal experts to broader patterns in the cases
which are visible only at a higher level of generality.  Similarly, resort to
simple attitudinal assumptions will help predict the votes of some Justices
but not others, and not those who matter most for outcomes.  Despite the
degree of discretion afforded the Supreme Court, and despite the
Court’s often confounding ideological equipoise on many issues, the sta-
tistical model succeeded in recognizing patterns in the Justices’ behavior
98. A great deal of recent legal scholarship discusses this cognitive psychology
literature and its implications for the law.  See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous
Litigation:  A Psychological Theory, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 163 (2000); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777 (2001);
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and
Legal Form:  Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 Or. L. Rev. 23 (2000); Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:  Removing the Rationality Assumption from
Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051 (2000); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases
in the Courts:  Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 Or. L. Rev. 61 (2000); Symposium, Empirical
Legal Realism:  A New Social Scientific Assessment of Law and Human Behavior, 97 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1075 (2003).
99. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light:  Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 417, 437–43 (2003)
(summarizing social science research on information overload).
100. Id. at 453–58 (citing research indicating that while experts may be better at
selectively filtering information than lay people, they can become overloaded and in fact
make worse decisions than lay people in certain circumstances).
101. Although we did not generate the data necessary to explore these theories, one
can speculate that the legal experts’ tendency to focus on recent, salient cases in a
particular area of the law, and their normative commitments to certain outcomes as more
desirable, might bias their judgments of what the Court is likely to do.
\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-4\COL401.txt unknown Seq: 38 30-APR-04 18:24
2004] SUPREME COURT FORECASTING PROJECT 1187
sufficient to predict correctly the outcomes of 75% of the cases.  Thus,
the machine—to a greater extent than the legal experts—appears to have
captured a measure of Llewellyn’s elusive “reckonability.”102  This result
suggests that accurate prediction depends on the identification of factors
that correlate with the Justices’ decisions at an intermediate level of gen-
erality:  less specific than “the statute in this case says x” and less general
than “Justice Y is a conservative.”  And on this score the model’s approach
to prediction worked well, particularly so for the important Justices at the
center of the Court.  How it might have done so merits further
exploration.
The model had one clear advantage in discerning these patterns with
respect to the current Rehnquist Court:  the hundreds of past cases in
which the Justices’ voting behavior was revealed.  But data collection is
only the first step; accurate prediction requires the selection of variables
that correlate sufficiently with behavior so that they can be used to fore-
cast unknown future cases.  A workable model requires that these vari-
ables be few in number.  The model succeeded to the extent that it did
because it identified case characteristics—observable before decision—
that correlate with outcomes across a broad variety of cases.
As discussed above, the final model relied on only six variables:  cir-
cuit of origin, identity of the petitioner, identity of the respondent, ideo-
logical direction of the decision below, claim of unconstitutionality, and
issue area.  To the legal eye, these six variables are an odd set of factors
on which to base predictions about the Court’s decisions.  Most of the
variables seem overly blunt and bereft of any analysis of doctrinal or tex-
tual specificity.  But although the model’s analysis is more general than a
particularistic legal perspective, it is significantly less general than the ba-
sic attitudinal assumption that some Justices are more liberal and some
are more conservative.  Instead the model relies heavily on variables of
intermediate generality.
For one thing, the model disaggregated the Justices and considered
behavior patterns independently rather than as a linear ideological array,
as attitudinal studies do expressly and the legal experts appear to have
done implicitly here.  Unlike the traditional attitudinal model, our statis-
tical model did not rigidly adhere to the assumption that the Justices are
arrayed linearly along some ideological space.  Rather, each Justice’s clas-
sification tree was estimated separately, and the trees differ dramatically
from one another, both in their shape and content.  Consistent with the
attitudinal model, the statistical model includes a variable for the liberal
or conservative orientation of the decision below in order to capture how
the Justices’ ideological preferences influence their willingness to reverse
the outcome.  Once again, however, the statistical model’s classification
trees capture the influence of ideology in a more subtle way than simply
predicting that conservative Justices will seek conservative outcomes and
102. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. R
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vice versa.  Other variables, such as the identity of the parties and the
circuit of origin, interact with the basic liberal or conservative nature of
the decision, allowing the Justices’ differing preferences to lead to differ-
ent responses depending upon the type of litigant or origin of the
case.103
To see how this approach might have been successful, consider two
areas in which the model did particularly well:  predicting the critical
votes of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, and predicting outcomes in the
doctrinally heterogeneous category of “economic activity” cases.  The
model’s success in predicting case outcomes was due in large part to its
accuracy in predicting the votes of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy.  The
model got Justice O’Connor’s vote right 70% of the time and Justice Ken-
nedy’s 72%, as compared with accuracy rates of 61% and 65%, respec-
tively, for the experts.  For the Court’s centrist Justices, neither close anal-
ysis of legal authority nor simple ideology offer much predictive power.
Instead, using the six general case characteristics, the statistical model
appears to have captured patterns in their voting behavior.
Consider Justice O’Connor’s classification tree.104  The first decision
point is blunt—it predicts a vote to reverse whenever the lower court de-
cision is “liberal.”  But as to “conservative” opinions under review, the
model’s classification of Justice O’Connor’s vote is both nuanced and sys-
tematic.  For instance, the model predicts that Justice O’Connor’s vote is
likely to differ depending upon the circuit of origin.  If a conservative
decision comes from the Second, Third, District of Columbia, or Federal
Circuit, she is likely to affirm.  If it arises from one of the other circuits,
she is more likely to reverse.  This does not imply that O’Connor votes to
affirm because a case is from the Second Circuit, but only that her votes
tend to correlate with the origin of the case in this way.  “Circuit of ori-
gin,” then, works as a proxy for some aspect of the legal process—not
directly observable—that influences outcomes.  One interpretation, con-
sistent with attitudinal explanations, is that judges in the Second, Third,
District of Columbia, and Federal Circuits are more closely aligned with
Justice O’Connor’s moderate-conservative ideology.  Alternatively, “cir-
cuit of origin” may capture some other differences—perhaps variations in
legal culture, the types of rationales offered by judges, or deference given
to particular appellate judges—that are more consistent with Justice
O’Connor’s legal philosophy.
103. The legal experts for the most part disregarded these variables relied on by the
machine.  These three—circuit of origin, identity of the petitioner, and identity of the
respondent—were deemed unimportant in the large majority of expert responses.
Respectively, 64%, 69.1%, and 75.5% of expert responses rated circuit of origin, identity of
petitioner, and identity of respondent a one or two on a five-point Likert scale (oneNot at
all important; five=very important).  See Appendix D.  To the extent that the interaction of
these variables also captures the Justices’ preferences, the experts, by largely ignoring
them, appear to have incorporated attitudinal assumptions into their predictions in a less
nuanced way than the statistical model.
104. See supra Figure 1.
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Another area of remarkable success for the model was its accuracy in
predicting the set of cases within the broad category of “economic activ-
ity” as coded by Spaeth.105  The “economic activity” category is “largely
commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee
actions vis-a`-vis employers.”106  Spaeth’s categories often seem peculiar to
legal academics, precisely because they do not take account of what seem
to be obvious legal distinctions—for instance, two cases arising under two
different federal statutes might be clumped together without reference to
glaring differences in the statutory texts.
The sixteen “economic activity” cases, as coded by Spaeth, illustrate
this divergence.  Viewed from a legal perspective, the cases are highly dis-
parate and offer few commonalities for use in analysis or prediction.  The
category includes cases ranging from Eldred v. Ashcroft,107 addressing the
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, to State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,108 challenging the constitutional-
ity of punitive damages as excessive under the Due Process Clause, to
Yellow Transportation v. Michigan,109 involving interpretation of the In-
termodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act.  Other cases in this issue
area turned on questions of bankruptcy law,110 the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act,111 interpretation of an arbitration agreement,112 and the
False Claims Act,113 among others.114  For lawyers, the cases appear to
involve a broad array of seemingly unrelated statutory and doctrinal
issues.
As discussed above, the machine did much better than the experts at
predicting the outcomes in the sixteen cases in this subject area—87.5%
correct to the experts’ 51.3%.  Particularly impressive was the model’s re-
markable success in predicting the votes of the three most important Jus-
tices on the current Court:  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy.  For those three jurists at the center-right of the
105. See Spaeth, Documentation, supra note 45, at 40–41. R
106. Id. at 42.
107. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
108. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
109. 537 U.S. 36 (2002).
110. Archer v. Warner, 123 S. Ct. 1462 (2003); FCC v. Nextwave Pers.
Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003).
111. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
112. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531 (2003); Howsam v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
113. Cook County v. United States, ex rel Chandler, 123 S. Ct. 1239 (2003).
114. Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 123 S. Ct. 2156 (2003) (state tax code/
Equal Protection Clause); Hillside Dairy v. Lyons, 123 S. Ct. 2142 (2003) (state milk pricing
regulations/Commerce Clause); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S.
Ct. 2041 (2003) (Lanham Act); Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 123 S. Ct. 1965
(2003) (Employee Retirement Income Security Act); Pharm. Research Mfrs. of Am. v.
Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003) (Medicaid); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210
(2003) (Federal Employers’ Liability Act); Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003)
(highway safety/Commerce Clause).
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current Court, the model’s success rates in predicting their votes in the
economic activity cases were 86.7%, 75%, and 81.2%, respectively, com-
pared with the experts’ accuracy rates of 55.6%, 51.3%, and 51.3%, re-
spectively.  In this doctrinally disparate area, the machine’s method ap-
pears to have captured some commonality among the cases that is
overlooked by more narrowly defined legal categories.  Spaeth has de-
scribed his own goal in creating such a typology as capturing “the subject
matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. . . . The objective is to
categorize the case from a public policy standpoint, a perspective that the
legal basis for decision . . . commonly disregards.”115  The fact that the
machine recognized such clear patterns in some of the Justices’ votes in
the economic activity cases suggests that there is some analytical gain to
grouping them together, despite their lack of connection from a textual
or doctrinal perspective.  The general grouping captures something rele-
vant to prediction that a more highly specified legal classification scheme
misses.
D. What Does Prediction Say About “The Nature of Law”?
In the ways explored above, a study such as this one offers some les-
sons about predicting cases, and perhaps also more generally about meth-
ods of observing and studying the Court.  Much less clear is whether pre-
dictive exercises have anything to say about the nature of law itself.
Frederick Schauer suggested that they might in a theoretical essay a few
years ago.  He maintained that “by looking at the various ways in which a
person might seek to predict the future behavior of judges, we will have
discovered something important about the type and size of the chunks
with which law makes its decisions, and, less directly, something equally
important about the nature of law itself.”116  We share much of his belief
that by comparing means of prediction, we can assess the “type and size
of the chunks with which law makes its decisions” and discern broader
patterns of judicial decisionmaking.  The results discussed above suggest
that—at least for the Supreme Court—bigger, more general “chunks”
may produce better predictions than attention to specific doctrine and
text.
However, anything our study has to say about the “nature of law it-
self” is highly indirect.  Part of the model’s success lay in its ability to
identify observable factors that correlate with decisions—it was indifferent
to underlying theories of causation or judicial motivation.  This indiffer-
ence may actually aid prediction, because many of the possible causal fac-
tors (such as stare decisis and judicial ideology) that might influence judi-
cial decisions in particular cases are extremely difficult to observe and
measure directly.  Precisely measuring the manner in which doctrine,
text, judicial ideology, institutional setting, and other factors interact to
115. Spaeth, Documentation, supra note 45, at 41. R
116. Schauer, supra note 23, at 774–75. R
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influence decisionmaking is probably impossible, but the model has done
the next best thing by identifying easily observable features that correlate
with decisionmaking at a reasonably high accuracy rate.  That such corre-
lations exist and can be measured does not mean that other more ob-
scure causal factors are not in fact driving the Court’s decisions.
That said, the correlated factors are neither random nor irrelevant,
nor are they unrelated to actual causation.  At the very least, for instance,
the fact that Justice O’Connor’s votes appear to vary consistently with cir-
cuit of origin across a variety of cases suggests that there are some under-
lying differences among the circuits that warrant further exploration.
That these factors are correlated with actual behavior lends some
credence (but in no way is a critical test of) spatial theories of voting.
Indeed, the fact that circuit of origin, issue area of the case, etc., are re-
lated to the types of cases heard by the Justices is not surprising because
the Justices choose the cases they hear.  While we could only hypothesize
about why, for example, the Court takes certain types of cases from cer-
tain circuits, the results of this study suggest some avenues to explore in
empirically modeling the agenda process.
Moreover, under any theoretical conception that regards law as con-
sisting at least in part of what judges do, proxies that reliably predict what
they will do in the future are worth considering as baselines or guideposts
of “law,” whether or not we can imagine them as “law” themselves.  We
noted above that Holmes’s famous Path of the Law address stressed the
importance of prediction without offering much to advance the project
of prediction.  But in a much earlier statement discussing what consti-
tutes the basis of “law,” Holmes maintained that “[a]ny motive for [judi-
cial] action . . . which can be relied upon as likely in the generality of
cases to prevail, is worthy of consideration as one of the sources of
law.”117  We have amended Holmes’s insight—in the ellipsis above he
enumerated four traditional “legal” sources (“constitution, statute, cus-
tom, or precedent”)—but, thus updated, his point seems highly applica-
ble to a study such as this one.  This study has not sought to determine
ultimate causation for, or full explanation of, what the Supreme Court
does.  But it has identified several broad factors that “can be relied upon
as likely in the generality of cases to prevail.”  The model’s proxies are not
“law” themselves, but they may capture something close to it that is inter-
esting and illuminating for those who study the Court.
In this way a reliable general prediction method makes some indirect
contribution to our sense of what “the law” might be—or at least the law
of the Supreme Court.  But of course this is an incomplete picture of
both the law and the Court, and we note here a few things that our study
emphatically does not say.  The first limitation applies to description and
analysis.  Prediction of outcomes alone gives little insight into the content
117. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notice:  The Law Magazine and Review, 6 Am.
L. Rev. 723, 724 (1872) (review of Frederick Pollock).
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of the Court’s opinions, and such content matters greatly for application
in the lower courts and for a ruling’s reception in broader American soci-
ety.  This study focused on binary results to the exclusion of opinion con-
tent, and so offers no insights regarding this important aspect of law.
Moreover, the focus on outcomes alone placed this contest solidly on the
statistical model’s turf.  Legal experts, particularly academics, spend their
time analyzing what the courts say, not merely what they do.  In this pro-
ject, we asked them to focus solely on what the Court might do, reducing
their predictions to a simple “affirm” or “reverse” forecast.118  Comparing
the machine and the legal experts solely on the basis of their vote and
outcome predictions is perhaps unfair to the experts, because it privileges
a certain type of performance and overlooks insights that, though valua-
ble, are more difficult to capture quantitatively.119  More fundamentally,
beyond binary outcomes the study has nothing to tell us about how the
Court is likely to shape, explain, and justify its important decisions.
Just as the study’s findings are limited even in this complete descrip-
tive sense, they are also largely bereft of specific normative import.  The
study focused on prediction of what the Court would do, not what it
should do.  Much of the best work in legal scholarship is expressly norma-
tive, offering the academy, the bar, and the Justices themselves persuasive
visions of how the law might, and should, look.  Calls for a return to
greater scholarly normativity are occasionally heard in political science as
well.  Our study speaks only indirectly to such normative scholarship.
Perhaps, by outlining certain broad patterns in the Justices’ past behav-
ior, studies such as this one will provide an additional point of back-
ground data for those who would more comprehensively assess and cri-
tique the Court’s jurisprudence.  The significant uncertainty in both
prediction methods is relevant here, since no Justice appears wholly pre-
dictable, and they may depart from prior patterns in ways that we applaud
or criticize.
A different kind of normative disclaimer is also necessary.  In focus-
ing on predicting the Court’s decisions, we do not mean to suggest that
predictability itself is the paramount goal either for those within the judi-
cial process or those who study it.  Some degree of regularity or predict-
ability in judicial decisionmaking is important to the functioning of the
system and the ability of people to anticipate the consequences of their
118. Although there were reasons for using this format, see supra Part II.A.3, some
experts were clearly and understandably frustrated by this limitation.  One expert wrote,
“You cannot possibly do this without breaking down the questions.  Here, the Court is
likely to split on the questions . . . that won’t fit a neat yes/no model.”
119. For example, legal experts correctly predicted that Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley,
537 U.S. 1 (2002), would be dismissed as improvidently granted, that Justice O’Connor
would not participate in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002), and
that Borden Ranch Partnership v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 537 U.S. 99 (2002),
would be affirmed by an equally divided Court after Justice Kennedy recused himself.
Because we could not easily classify these outcomes in our coding scheme, the legal experts
got no “credit” for anticipating these developments.
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actions.  Such concerns underlie the value placed on stare decisis and the
rule of law.  However, given the crucial role of the Supreme Court in our
society, absolute predictability in its decisions should not be expected,
nor would it be desirable.  To suggest, as some have, that a computer
model, once perfected, might someday substitute for actual judges,120 en-
tirely ignores what makes the Supreme Court a uniquely important insti-
tution.  Its role in American society is not merely to process important
disputes expeditiously.  Rather, the ways in which it addresses those dis-
putes—not merely through outcomes, but through its rationales, its ana-
lytical framework, and its language—both gives voice to certain values
and influences public understanding of these issues.  Though their inter-
pretations are often vigorously contested, the Justices’ words frame the
terms of the debate.  How impoverished the work of the Court would be
if, for example, Justice Kennedy’s sweeping opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas121 had been reduced to the words “we reverse.”  We disclaim any
implication that a statistical model—however accurate—could in any way
substitute for the important work that the Justices do.
Similarly, we reject the notion that the model’s predictive accuracy
renders irrelevant factual nuances or skillful legal argument in particular
cases.  The model did have some success at using general case characteris-
tics to predict outcomes, but it also missed a full quarter of the decisions.
After all, its predictions are based on observed patterns in the Justices’
behavior, not rigid certainties.  There will always be some cases that de-
part from the general pattern, and the skillful advocate will be able to
exploit distinctive facts, or make novel connections between legal princi-
ples in ways that reinforce or counteract these general trends, to the cli-
ent’s advantage.  Moreover, a statistical model such as this one, which
assumes that past behavior best predicts future behavior, is a necessarily
limited way of modeling the judgments of real human beings who are
capable of evolving over time.  What the model can do is to assess system-
atically what good lawyers know already in a rough sense:  that some cases
are better shots than others, and relatedly, that on particular cases some
Justices’ votes will be easier to get than others.
CONCLUSION
In the manner suggested above, we think that the results of this com-
parative study provide interesting additive insights into the manner in
which those who follow and study the Supreme Court might conceptual-
ize its decisionmaking.  The model’s success here suggests that there is
120. For a notable early proposal of this sort, see Harold D. Lasswell, Current Studies
of the Decision Process:  Automation Versus Creativity, 8 W. Pol. Q. 381, 398 (1955)
(“When machines are more perfect [than human decisionmakers] a bench of judicial
robots . . . can be constructed.”).  Lasswell proposed building models to predict Supreme
Court decisionmaking and noted that “a robot facsimile of the less repetitive members of
the Court would provide a genuine challenge to the engineers.”  Id.
121. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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some value to assessing the Court’s behavior in accordance with factors of
intermediate generality—more general than particularized doctrine, text,
or facts, and more specific than simple ideological assumptions.  The
model has discovered a few factors of such intermediate generality that
track reasonably well with Supreme Court decisionmaking, and there may
be others of equal or greater significance.
Beyond these possible substantive lessons, we hoped through this ex-
plicitly interdisciplinary study design to create a project that would be of
interest to the two groups of scholars who study the Supreme Court most
closely, and thereby to enhance the gradually increasing dialogue be-
tween our two disciplines.  In a previous cycle of interdisciplinary interest,
a participant in a Harvard Law Review symposium on Social Science Ap-
proaches to the Judicial Process asserted that “[i]n practice, a field seems
to progress as—and if—it moves from theory to empirical data and back
to theory.”122  We share this sentiment, and have acted on it, but with one
amendment:  The empiricism that informs theory about judicial decision-
making is most useful if it incorporates prospective experimentation
along with more common retrospective analysis.
122. Samuel Krislov, Theoretical Attempts at Predicting Judicial Behavior, 79 Harv. L.
Rev. 1573, 1573 (1966).
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APPENDIX A
ESTIMATED CLASSIFICATION TREES
FIGURE 6:  ESTIMATED CLASSIFICATION TREE FOR UNANIMOUS
LIBERAL CASES.
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Is the primary issue criminal




Is the petitioner a business,
employer, employee, criminal






























\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-4\COL401.txt unknown Seq: 47 30-APR-04 18:24
1196 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1150
FIGURE 7:  ESTIMATED CLASSIFICATION TREE FOR UNANIMOUS
CONSERVATIVE CASES.
Start
Case from the 1st,
4th, 5th, 6th, 8th,
10th, 11th, or DC
circuit?
Is the primary issue attorneys, criminal
procedure, civil rights, economic
activity, First Amendment, federalism,
judicial power, or federal taxation?
Did the petitioner claim that
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FIGURE 10:  ESTIMATED CLASSIFICATION TREE FOR CHIEF JUSTICE
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APPENDIX B
LEGAL EXPERT PARTICIPANTS*
Rachel E. Barkow, New York University School of Law
David J. Barron, Harvard Law School
Anthony J. Bellia Jr., University of Notre Dame Law School
Yochai Benkler, Yale Law School
James F. Bennett, Bryan Cave LLP, Saint Louis, Missouri
Paul Schiff Berman, University of Connecticut School of Law
Stephanos Bibas, University of Iowa College of Law
John H. Blume, Habeas Assistance and Training Project / Cornell Law School
Mary Ann Bobinski, University of Houston Law Center
Beth S. Brinkmann, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Washington, D.C.
Rebecca L. Brown, Vanderbilt University School of Law
Daniel J. Capra, Fordham Law School
Erwin Chemerinsky, University of Southern California Law School
Jesse H. Choper, University of California at Berkeley School of Law
Thomas Colby, George Washington University Law School
David D. Cole, Georgetown University Law Center
Brannon P. Denning, Cumberland School of Law
Neal E. Devins, William & Mary School of Law
Laura Dickinson, University of Connecticut School of Law
Michael C. Dorf, Columbia Law School
Christopher R. Drahozal, University of Kansas School of Law
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, New York University School of Law
Theodore Eisenberg, Cornell Law School
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Yale Law School
Katherine Hunt Federle, Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law
Alan L. Feld, Boston University School of Law
Jonathan S. Franklin, Hogan & Hartson LLP, Washington, D.C.
Philip P. Frickey, University of California at Berkeley School of Law
Charles Fried, Harvard Law School
Kenneth S. Geller, Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, Washington, D.C.
Heather K. Gerken, Harvard Law School
David H. Getches, University of Colorado School of Law
John C. P. Goldberg, Vanderbilt University School of Law
Roger L. Goldman, Saint Louis University School of Law
Thomas C. Goldstein, Goldstein & Howe, Washington, D.C.
David J. Gottlieb, University of Kansas School of Law
Margaret M. Harding, Syracuse University College of Law
Pamela Harris, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C.
Melissa Hart, University of Colorado School of Law
Neal K. Katyal, Georgetown University Law Center
Jay P. Kesan, University of Illinois College of Law
Nancy J. King, Vanderbilt University School of Law
Sylvia A. Law, New York University School of Law
Robert M. Lawless, University of Nevada, Las Vegas School of Law
Douglas Laycock, University of Texas School of Law
Richard J. Lazarus, Georgetown University Law Center
* Expert affiliations listed are as of the date of publication.
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James S. Liebman, Columbia Law School
Arnold H. Loewy, University of North Carolina School of Law
Deborah C. Malamud, New York University School of Law
Jeremy Maltby, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Los Angeles, CA
Paul Marcus, William & Mary School of Law
Stephen R. McAllister, University of Kansas School of Law
Robert P. Merges, University of California at Berkeley School of Law
Gillian E. Metzger, Columbia Law School
Geoffrey P. Miller, New York University School of Law
Paul Mogin, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, D.C.
Dana Muir, University of Michigan Business School
Gerald L. Neuman, Columbia Law School
Spencer Overton, George Washington University Law School
Robert V. Percival, University of Maryland Law School
Richard H. Pildes, New York University School of Law
Robert C. Post, Yale Law School
Robert K. Rasmussen, Vanderbilt University School of Law
Alan Scott Rau, University of Texas School of Law
Larry E. Ribstein, University of Illinois College of Law
Daniel B. Rodriguez, University of San Diego School of Law
Peter J. Rubin, Georgetown University Law Center
Stewart J. Schwab, Cornell Law School
Anthony J. Sebok, Brooklyn Law School
Daniel N. Shaviro, New York University School of Law
Suzanna Sherry, Vanderbilt University School of Law
Alexander Tallchief Skibine, University of Utah College of Law
Joan E. Steinman, Chicago-Kent College of Law
Charles Jordan Tabb, University of Illinois College of Law
George C. Thomas III, Rutgers School of Law—Newark
Joseph P. Tomain, University of Cincinnati College of Law
Alan Untereiner, Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck & Untereiner LLP, Washington, D.C.
Robert R. M. Verchick, University of Missouri—Kansas City School of Law
Eugene Volokh, University of California, Los Angeles School of Law
Robert N. Weiner, Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C.
Robert Weisberg, Stanford Law School
Brian Wolfman, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, University of Florida College of Law
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APPENDIX C
PREDICTIONS AND OUTCOMES IN SELECTED MAJOR CASES FROM
2002 TERM
Stevens Ginsburg Breyer Souter O’Connor Kennedy Rehnquist Scalia Thomas Result
Lawrence v. Texas
Model Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm 5-4 to Reverse
Expert 1 Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm 6-3 to Reverse
Expert 2 Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm 6-3 to Reverse
Expert 3 Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm 5-4 to Affirm
Actual Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm 6-3 to Reverse
Grutter v. Bollinger
Model Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Expert 1 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Affirm
Expert 2 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Expert 3 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Actual Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Affirm
Gratz v. Bollinger
Model Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Expert 1 Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 6-3 to Reverse
Expert 2 Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 6-3 to Reverse
Expert 3 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Actual Affirm Affirm Reverse Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 6-3 to Reverse
Ewing v. California
Model Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Reverse Affirm 6-3 to Reverse
Expert 1 Reverse Reverse Affirm Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm 6-3 to Affirm
Expert 2 Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm 5-4 to Affirm
Expert 3 Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm 5-4 to Affirm
Actual Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm 5-4 to Affirm
Lockyer v. Andrade
Model Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 8-1 to Reverse
Expert 1 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Affirm
Expert 2 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Expert 3 Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 7-2 to Reverse
Actual Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Sell v. United States
Model Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm 5-4 to Affirm
Expert 1 Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm 5-4 to Reverse
Expert 2 Reverse Affirm Affirm Reverse Affirm Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm 6-3 to Affirm
Actual Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm 6-3 to Reverse
Connecticut v. Doe
Model Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 9-0 to Reverse
Expert 1 Affirm Affirm Reverse Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 6-3 to Reverse
Expert 2 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Expert 3 Affirm Reverse Reverse Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 7-2 to Reverse
Actual Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 9-0 to Reverse
Smith v. Doe
Model Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 8-1 to Reverse
Expert 1 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Expert 2 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Expert 3 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm 7-2 to Affirm
Actual Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 6-3 to Reverse
Stogner v. California
Model Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Reverse Affirm 6-3 to Reverse
Expert 1 Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm 5-4 to Affirm
Expert 2 Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 9-0 to Reverse
Expert 3 Reverse Affirm Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Actual Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm 5-4 to Reverse
Scheidler v. NOW
Model Affirm Affirm Reverse Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 6-3 to Reverse
Expert 1 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse 7-2 to Affirm
Expert 2 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Affirm
Actual Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 8-1 to Reverse
Nevada Dep’t of HR v. Hibbs
Model Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 9-0 to Reverse
Expert 1 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Expert 2 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Expert 3 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Actual Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Affirm Reverse Reverse 6-3 to Affirm
Demore v. Kim
Model Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 9-0 to Reverse
Expert 1 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse 6-3 to Affirm
Expert 2 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Affirm
Expert 3 Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Actual Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
State Farm v. Campbell
Model Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Expert 1 Reverse Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm 6-3 to Reverse
Expert 2 Reverse Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm 5-4 to Reverse
Expert 3 Reverse Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse 8-1 to Reverse
Actual Reverse Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Affirm 6-3 to Reverse
Eldred v. Ashcroft
Model Reverse Reverse Affirm Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm 6-3 to Affirm
Expert 1 Affirm Reverse Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Affirm Reverse Reverse 5-4 to Reverse
Expert 2 Reverse Affirm Affirm Reverse Reverse Reverse Affirm Reverse Reverse 6-3 to Reverse
Actual Reverse Affirm Reverse Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm Affirm 7-2 to Affirm
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APPENDIX D
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF SURVEY RESPONSES
Factor Mean % Rating Factor As % Rating Factor As(Factors in bold were rated as important by Response Not Important (1 or 2) Important (4 or 5)a majority of respondents)
Identity of the court whose decision the 2.1729 64.7 17.3Supreme Court is reviewing
Existence of a divided court below 1.9792 66.7 10.4
Extent of disagreement in the circuits and/or 2.5263 49.7 21.1state courts on the issue
Identity of the petitioner 1.9470 71.9 13.7
Identity of the respondent 1.8788 75.8 12.1
Identity of counsel representing the parties 1.3806 92.6 4.5
Quality of the parties’ briefs 1.9776 66.4 10.4
Supreme Court precedent on point 3.8966 15.6 69.0
Supreme Court dicta on point 3.3947 23.6 54.4
Other statements by the Justices in prior 3.2061 31.3 49.6opinions
Text of relevant constitutional provision(s) 2.2771 62.7 21.6
Text of relevant statute 3.5495 22.5 54.0
Text of relevant regulation 2.6250 52.1 35.4
Non-textual evidence of meaning of
constitutional, statutory, or administrative 3.1327 30.1 44.3provision (e.g., legislative history, long-
standing practice, etc.)
Interpretive theories of the Justices 3.6364 19.0 62.9
Practical consequences of the decision 3.9254 9.7 73.8
Policy preferences of the Justices on the 3.6045 23.8 65.0specific issue presented
The conservative or liberal ideologies of the 3.3282 29.0 54.2individual Justices
Public opinion on the issue 1.7967 78.1 9.8
Composition and preferences of Congress 1.3588 90.0 2.3
Composition and preferences of the 1.5420 84.8 4.6Executive Branch
The professional backgrounds of the Justices 1.6343 80.5 4.5
The personal backgrounds of the Justices 1.5970 82.1 5.2
Number of amici participating in the case 1.3984 87.8 2.4
Identity of amici participating in the case 1.7097 76.6 7.3
Position of the Solicitor General in an amicus 2.5204 52.0 27.6filing
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